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I. INTRODUCTION 
We have to be careful to resist reactions that could endanger pain 
treatment—a fundamental right for all of us—when it is unclear that the 
proposed solution will succeed in any of its aims or that it even addresses 
the real locus of the problem.1 
Jay Lawrence died by suicide after his providers unilaterally and too 
rapidly decreased his pain medication.2  They did so in response to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Guideline for 
Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain (CDC Guideline or Guideline),3 
despite the fact that the CDC Guideline is for primary care providers 
making decisions about beginning opioids in opioid naïve patients.4  The 
                                                          
*  Assistant Professor and Director, Health Law Program, Creighton University School of Law.  I am 
grateful for the many patients with chronic pain and the array of careful and compassionate providers 
with whom I have worked in the past, as well as the opportunity to work for and with Sandra H. 
Johnson, a pioneer in the use of law and policy to improve pain treatment.  Those experiences deeply 
informed this article.  As always, Sean Dineen is my champion and best proof-reader—I am grateful 
for his constant support.  Many thanks to John Bergstresser, who provided research assistance for this 
article and to Dr. Stacey Tovino, Victoria Haneman, and Greg O’Meara for their thoughtful comments.  
All of them made this article better.  Any errors are mine alone.  I published an abbreviated form of 
this article in the Hastings Center Report in 2018.  See Kelly K. Dineen, Defining Misprescribing to 
Inform Prescription Opioid Policy, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 4, 5–6 (2018). 
 1.   Evan Anderson & Scott Burris, Opioid Treatment Agreements Are the Answer. What Is the 
Question?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2010, at 17. 
 2.   Meredith Lawrence, How the CDC Guidelines Killed My Husband, 8 NARRATIVE INQUIRY 
BIOETHICS 219, 219 (2018); see also Meredith Lawrence, How Chronic Pain Killed My Husband, 
PAIN NEWS NETWORK (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.painnewsnetwork.org/stories/2017/9/4/how-
chronic-pain-killed-my-husband [https://perma.cc/AWA6-42PT] (“When the doctor took away Jay’s 
medications, they took away his quality of life.  That was what led to his decision.  Jay fought hard to 
live with his pain for a long time, but in the end fighting just was not enough.”). 
 3.   Lawrence, How the CDC Guidelines Killed My Husband, supra note 2, at 219 (“The 
decision to cut down his medication was based solely on his doctor’s misinterpretation of the CDC 
guidelines.”). 
 4.   Deborah Dowell et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Guideline for 
Prescribing Opioid for Chronic Pain—United States, 2016, 65 MMWR RECOMMENDATIONS & REP. 
1, 3 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/pdfs/rr6501e1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB3C-
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Guideline did not apply to Jay, who had been on a stable dose of 
prescription opioids for years,5 nor did it apply to his providers, who were 
pain specialists, not primary care providers.6  Moreover, the Guideline 
specifically states “[c]linical decision making should be based on a 
relationship between the clinician and patient, and an understanding of the 
patient’s clinical situation, functioning, and life context.  The 
recommendations in the guideline are voluntary, rather than prescriptive 
standards.”7  In fact, the Guideline is written specifically with the patient 
context in mind and includes a statement that higher daily doses should be 
justified by the patient’s condition.8 
Nonetheless, out of fear, misunderstanding, or self-protection, the 
Guideline was misapplied here and misconstrued by providers, 
lawmakers, and law enforcement throughout the country, with many states 
adopting the non-prescriptive daily dosage recommendations as black 
letter law.9  Jay’s providers made sweeping decisions about every patient 
in their practice—unilaterally decreasing every patient on prescription 
opioids to 45mg of morphine milligram equivalents (MME)10 per day (half 
the 90mg MME in the CDC Guideline) regardless of their current doses or 
circumstances, and certainly not in the context of the patient’s individual 
clinical situation.11  According to Jay’s widow, 
                                                          
T8MW] (“This guideline is intended for primary care clinicians . . . who are considering prescribing 
opioid pain medication for painful conditions that can or have become chronic.”). 
 5.   Lawrence, How Chronic Pain Killed My Husband, supra note 2. 
 6.   Id.  I intentionally use the term “provider” throughout this essay.  Scholarship in this area 
too often focuses only on physicians when many types of health care providers (e.g., dentists, advanced 
practice nurses, psychologists, physician assistants) are authorized by state law and the Drug 
Enforcement Agency to prescribe opioids. 
 7.   Dowell et al., supra note 4, at 2 (emphasis added).  
 8.   Id. at 23 (“Most experts also agreed that opioid dosages should not be increased to ≥90 
[morphine milligram equivalents]/day without careful justification based on diagnosis and on 
individualized assessment of benefits and risks.”). 
 9.   Kurt Kroenke et al., Challenges with Implementing the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention Opioid Guideline: A Consensus Panel Report, 20 PAIN MED., 724 (2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/pm/pny307 [https://perma.cc/L3UY-CY4H]; see also Corey S. Davis et al., 
Laws Limiting the Prescribing or Dispensing of Opioids for Acute Pain in the United States: A 
National Systematic Legal Review, 194 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 166 (2019) (conducting a 
national survey and identifying themes of state laws limiting prescriptions through 2017); Prescribing 
Policies: States Confront Opioid Overdose Epidemic, NCSL (Oct. 31, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/health/prescribing-policies-states-confront-opioid-overdose-epidemic.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/2SDE-CYFG]. 
 10.   Daily morphine milligram equivalents are an attempt to standardize the opioid dosing of any 
prescription opioid medication.  See, e.g., Alexandra L. McPherson, Safety in Numbers or Lack 
Thereof: Opioid Conversion Calculators, PHARMACY TODAY, Sept. 2017, at 44.  The ways in which 
CDC calculates daily MME is also the source of significant controversy.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Fudin et 
al., Safety Concerns with the Centers for Disease Control Opioid Calculator, 11 J. PAIN RES. 1 (2017).   
 11.   Lawrence, How the CDC Guidelines Killed My Husband, supra note 2, at 220 (“During his 
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Jay was a “model” pain patient.  He was seen at a pain clinic at least 
monthly.  He never took more pills than prescribed, and he only received 
opiates from that clinic.  He attempted any treatment alternatives offered 
by his doctor, his pill counts were accurate at each visit, and he never 
failed a urinalysis.12 
Jay was one of the estimated twenty million people in the United 
States with high-impact chronic pain.13  After multiple back surgeries, 
physical therapy, injections, two implanted devices for pain, and myriad 
alternative treatments, Jay found a daily routine that included opioids that 
allowed him to function.14  For Jay, the benefits of opioids outweighed the 
risks; he showed no signs of an opioid use disorder (OUD), other substance 
use disorder (SUD),15 or other adverse effects.16  There was simply no 
clinical justification for the decision. 
There are a multitude of reasons for providers acting contrary to their 
ethical and professional obligation to patient well-being; when it comes to 
                                                          
visit the PA told Jay that as a practice they would be decreasing all of their patients on high dose 
opioids to under 45 mg a day total.”).  At that time, Jay was on more than 120 morphine equivalents 
per day.  Id.  A dose taper to 45mg per day was about a third of his functional dose.   
 12.   Id. at 219.  Of note, Jay’s widow was also charged with assisted suicide because she had 
purchased the gun Jay used to end his life.  Id. at 221.  She is currently on probation.  Id. 
 13.   See id. at 219–221.  High-impact chronic pain limits “life or work activities on most days or 
every day in the past 6 months.”  James Dahlhamer et al., Prevalence of Chronic Pain and High-
Impact Chronic Pain Among Adults — United States, 67 MMWR MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 1001, 1002 (2018).  See also Mark H. Pitcher et al., Prevalence and Profile of High-Impact 
Chronic Pain in the United States, 20 J. PAIN 146, 148 (2019) (analyzing prevalence of high impact 
chronic pain using a definition of having “pain present on most days or every day over previous 3 
months” and having one or more major activity limitation).  For a variety of reasons, the prevalence 
of chronic pain in the United States continues to increase.  See generally Richard L. Nahin et al., 
Eighteen-Year Trends in the Prevalence of, and Health Care Use for, Noncancer Pain in the United 
States: Data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, J. PAIN (forthcoming 2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2019.01.003 [https://perma.cc/R53Z-RZTK]. 
 14.   Lawrence, How the CDC Guidelines Killed My Husband, supra note 2, at 220. 
 15.   The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fifth Edition 
(DSM-V), combines previous definitions of substance abuse and substance dependence into a 
spectrum called Substance Use Disorder (SUD) that ranges from mild to severe.  Opioid Use Disorder 
is a subset of SUDs.  For more information on the DSM V Criteria for SUD, see generally Deborah 
S. Hasin et al., DSM-5 Criteria for Substance Use Disorders: Recommendations and Rationale, 170 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 834 (2013).  
 16.   Lawrence, How the CDC Guidelines Killed My Husband, supra note 2, at 219. 
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opioids,17 fear of legal and regulatory scrutiny is among them,18 a recurring 
theme over decades,19 but one that is especially salient in the current 
climate.20  This coupled with often incomplete understanding of laws and 
policies,21 can lead to distorted reactions that cause patients harm.22 
                                                          
 17.   I use the term opioids throughout this paper to mean prescription and illicit opioid drugs, 
any drug that interacts with opioid receptors in the body.  The term includes both opiates (opioids that 
are derived from opium) and synthetic or partially synthesized (man-made) opioids, such as fentanyl.  
I will use the term prescription opioids when referring specifically to opioids that have been 
manufactured via the formal FDA process, legally in the chain of interstate commerce, and dispensed 
to a patient via a valid prescription.  Common prescription opioids include oxycodone, hydrocodone, 
fentanyl, morphine, codeine, meperidine, Methadone, and hydromorphone.  Illicit opioids include 
heroin, which is a schedule I drug under the Controlled Substance Act and thus is not available on the 
prescription market in the United States.  Illicit opioids also include versions of all prescription opioids 
that are manufactured on the black market, including illicit fentanyl, which is often laced with heroin.  
See generally Opioids, NIH, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids (last visited Apr. 17, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/54M4-4JQD]; Controlled Substances Schedules, DIVERSION CONTROL 
DIVISION, https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/#define (last visited Apr. 17, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/JJL5-X6PB].  
 18.   See, e.g., April Dembosky, California Doctors Alarmed as State Links Their Opioid 
Prescriptions to Deaths, NAT. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 23, 2019, 2:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/health-shots/2019/01/23/687376371/california-doctors-alarmed-as-state-links-their-opioid-
prescriptions-to-deaths [https://perma.cc/WF8B-F2PC] (“Some doctors . . . have been so frightened 
by the letters that they’ve lowered their patients’ opioid doses or cut them off completely.  Some 
doctors are telling their chronic pain patients to find another doctor, according to the California 
Medical Association.  This carries a whole new set of risks.”). 
 19.   See, e.g., Scott M. Fishman, Risk of the View Through the Keyhole: There Is Much More to 
Physician Reactions to the DEA Than the Number of Formal Actions, 7 PAIN MED. 360, 360 (2006) 
(“It seems that all you may need to change physician behavior is to simply advance intimidating policy 
statements or even initiate a few physician investigations that begin with a visit from DEA field agents 
dressed in flak jackets who carry weapons.  Physician fear of regulatory scrutiny may not always be 
based on real threats, but they lead to real changes in prescribing behaviors that can substantially 
impair the treatment of patients in pain.”); Kelly R. Knight et al., Opioid Pharmacovigilance: A 
Clinical-Social History of The Changes in Opioid Prescribing for Patients with Co-Occurring Chronic 
Non-Cancer Pain and Substance Use, 186 SOC. SCI. & MED. 87, 88 (2017). 
 20.   See, e.g., Sarah M. Hall et al., INSIGHT: DOJ Opioid Warning Letters—Legitimate Law 
Enforcement Purpose or Prosecutorial Overreach?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 4, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/insight-doj-opioid-warning-letters-
legitimate-law-enforcement-purpose-or-prosecutorial-overreach [https://perma.cc/35B9-72YJ] 
(critiquing the practice of some federal prosecutors in sending letters to providers they deem to have 
problematic prescribing practices even though the prescribers are not the target of an investigation); 
Cheryl Clark, Doctors Call California’s Probe of Opioid Deaths a ‘Witch Hunt’, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (Jan. 23, 2019), https://khn.org/news/doctors-call-californias-probe-of-opioid-deaths-a-witch-
hunt/ [https://perma.cc/6NRB-3LFH] (“Using terms such as ‘witch hunt’ and ‘inquisition,’ many 
doctors said the project is leading them or their peers to refuse patients’ requests for painkiller 
prescription—no matter how well documented the need—out of fear their practices will come under 
disciplinary review.”).  
 21.   See, e.g., Brian K. Yorkgitis et al., Surgery Program Directors’ Knowledge of Opioid 
Prescribing Regulations: A Survey Study, 227 J. SURGICAL RES. 194, 197 (2018). 
 22.   See, e.g., Anne Fuqua, The Other Opioid Crisis: Pain Patients Who Can’t Access The 
Medicine We Need, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2018) (“[M]y doctor chose to leave pain management.  He 
told me he could no longer stand the paperwork and stress involved with being a pain specialist and 
trying to decide between protecting his ability to provide for his family and protecting his patients.”). 
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Jay’s case is not an isolated incident.  There are widespread reports of 
prescribers refusing to see patients in chronic pain (whether or not they 
use opioids),23 reflexively reducing patients’ opioid prescriptions,24 or 
abandoning the use of opioids altogether absent context.25  One doctor 
explained to Human Rights Watch: 
There’s a lot of talk in the pain medicine world that if you do not get 
people down to 90 morphine equivalents, you set yourself up for a 
liability, especially if something were to happen to that patient.  It doesn’t 
matter if you did everything appropriately [to prevent abuse]—and we 
do everything, urine drug testing, prescription monitoring, screening for 
mental health issues, pill counts.  It doesn’t feel like enough. We still feel 
like we’re vulnerable to being held liable for patients if they’re over that 
guideline limit, even when you know they’re not addicted and they’re 
benefitting [from opioids].26 
And these reactions are not just limited to the care of patients with 
non-malignant chronic pain.27  At a meeting of the American Medical 
                                                          
 23.   See, e.g., George Comerci et al., Controlling the Swing of the Opioid Pendulum, 378 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 691, 691–93 (2018). 
 24.   See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “NOT ALLOWED TO BE COMPASSIONATE” 3–4 (2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/hhr1218_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/PKW9-A9LU] 
(“[T]he atmosphere around prescribing for chronic pain had become so fraught that physicians felt 
they must avoid opioid analgesics even in cases when it contradicted their view of what would provide 
the best care for their patients.  In some cases, this desire to cut back on opioid prescribing translated 
to doctors tapering patients off their medications without patient consent, while in others it meant that 
physicians would no longer accept patients who had a history of needing high-dose opioids”). 
 25.   See, e.g., Marilyn Serafini, The Physician’s Quandary with Opioids: Pain Versus Addiction, 
NEJM CATALYST (Apr. 26, 2018), https://catalyst.nejm.org/quandary-opioids-chronic-pain-
addiction/ [https://perma.cc/J24Z-2LB4 ] (“A 78-year-old woman on the West Coast says she is so 
terrified of retribution against the physician prescribing her opioids that she won’t share her name.  
She has chronic pain from childhood polio and has had multiple back surgeries.  As in other states, the 
health department where she lives is tracking prescribing, and that has made her physicians nervous, 
she says.  First her primary care clinic ceased all opioid prescribing, then her pain specialist cut her 
off.  Despite the help of patient advocates, multiple pain clinics declined to take her as a patient, while 
family and friends scraped together excess pills from their medicine cabinets to keep her stable until 
she found a specialist to prescribe for her.  Now, she says, that clinician is fearful of crossing 
prescribing lines and has told her the clinic may not be around much longer.”); David Hanscom, 
Limiting Rx Opioids is Making Opioid Crisis Worse, PAIN NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 14 2019), 
https://www.painnewsnetwork.org/stories/2019/1/14/how-modern-medicine-pretends-to-treat-pain 
[https://perma.cc/X8N7-F6G7] (“Instead of exploring ways to implement effective treatments for 
pain, the government and medical establishment are focusing their efforts on restricting access to pain 
medications—with most of the focus being on the providers.  Physicians are now afraid to prescribe 
long-term opioids, even though most of us have had patients thrive on a stable opioid regimen.”). 
 26.   HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 24, at iii. 
 27.   I generally do not distinguish between high-impact chronic pain related to cancer or non-
cancer diagnoses because of the attendant false dichotomies but do so here for clarity and because 
nearly all prescribing policies exempt patients with cancer or terminal illness from restriction.  For a 
more in-depth discussion of my reasoning, see Kelly K. Dineen, Addressing Prescription Opioid 
Abuse Concerns in Context: Synchronizing Policy Solutions to Multiple Complex Public Health 
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Association, Dr. McAney shared the story of a patient with severe bone 
pain from metastatic cancer who was denied his opioid prescription by the 
pharmacist—“[f]eeling ashamed after the pharmacist called him a ‘drug 
seeker,’ he went home, hoping to endure his pain.  Three days later, he 
tried to kill himself.  Fortunately, [he] was discovered by family members 
and survived.”28  No research, guideline, or policy denies prescription 
opioids to patients with metastatic cancer; stories like these illustrate the 
extent to which personal fears and decision-making bias may drive 
disproportionate reactions to situations involving opioids.29  Those 
disproportionate reactions are harmful, sometimes fatally so, and all of us 
involved in opioid policy have a moral obligation to minimize the 
consequences of policy that is poorly crafted or interpreted perversely. 
Much of the policy discourse around prescription opioids has used 
terms like “overprescribing,” “inappropriate prescribing,” 
“misprescribing,” or “overutilization” (collectively, inappropriate 
prescribing) but inconsistently and without definition, what I describe as a 
failed heuristic.30  For example, the CDC Guideline does not define 
inappropriate prescribing at all.31  A recent report from the National 
                                                          
Problems, 40 L. & PSYCH. REV. 1 (2016); see also Rolf-Detlef Treede et al., Chronic Pain as A 
Symptom or A Disease: The IASP Classification of Chronic Pain for the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD-11), 160 PAIN 19, 22–23 (describing, in part, the various cancer related and cancer 
treatment related types of painful conditions, some of which remain after treatment when cancer is in 
remission or cured). 
 28.   Kate M. Nicholson et al., Overzealous Use of the CDC Opioid Prescribing Guideline is 
Harming Pain Patients, STAT (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/12/06/overzealous-
use-cdc-opioid-prescribing-guideline/ [https://perma.cc/FQG7-NNML].  I personally received an 
urgent text from a colleague recently about the laws in Nebraska after a family member was denied a 
prescription for opioids by a pharmacy.  That individual was obviously cachectic and in the end stages 
of Stage IV metastatic cancer, had lost her hair, and even showed the pharmacist the multiple 
intravenous ports in her chest for chemotherapy to no avail.  
 29.   See Dineen, supra note 27, at 32–46. 
 30.   Some use the term overprescribing to mean prescribing too early from the last prescription.  
See, e.g., Aileen P. Wright et al., Strategies for Flipping the Script on Opioid Overprescribing, 176 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1, 7 (2016) (telling the story of a patient who received habitually early renewed 
prescriptions from a less than careful physician).  Some use it to mean reflexively prescribing a set 
amount, such as automatically prescribing for 30 days, after a procedure.  See, e.g., Martin A. Makary 
et al., Overprescribing Is Major Contributor to Opioid Crisis, BMJ, Oct. 19, 2017, at 1, 1–2, 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.j4792 [https://perma.cc/2E22-YB47].  Some use the term to mean 
continuing to prescribe opioids in the current climate.  See, e.g., Fiona Webster et al., From 
Opiophobia to Overprescribing: A Critical Scoping Review of Medical Education Training for 
Chronic Pain, 18 PAIN MED. 1467 (2017) (identifying a shift in medical education literature from the 
characterization of not prescribing opioids as opiophobia to prescribing opioids as overprescribing or 
inappropriate prescribing). 
 31.   A document search showed no matches for inappropriate prescribing or misprescribing.  
“Overprescribing” appears once without definition: “Across specialties, physicians believe that opioid 
pain medication can be effective in controlling pain, that addiction is a common consequence of 
prolonged use, and that long-term opioid therapy often is overprescribed for patients with chronic 
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Academies of Science, Pain Management and the Opioid Epidemic, uses 
the terms overprescribing and inappropriate prescribing to implicitly 
describe a host of very distinct prescribing behaviors.32  A comprehensive 
policy document by the Aspen Institute uses overprescribing 
imprecisely.33  Although many federal and state laws reference 
inappropriate prescribing, I was unable to locate any that actually defines 
inappropriate prescribing, overprescribing, or misprescribing.34 
The lack of definitional clarity for inappropriate prescribing in 
existing law and policy renders the responses like those of Jay’s providers 
predictable.35  It also compounds uncertainty in caring for patients with 
complex health conditions associated with opioids,36 and sets the stage for 
decreased quality of care, increased patient avoidance, and increased 
morbidity and mortality.  In the absence of any definitions, providers may 
logically look to the recommended maximum daily MME and pick a target 
number under that threshold to demonstrate absolute compliance.37  This 
                                                          
noncancer pain.”  Dowell et al., supra note 4, at 3. 
 32.   “Overprescribing” and “inappropriate prescribing” appear in several places throughout the 
document without definition and in very different contexts.  NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., 
PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2017), 
https://www.nap.edu/read/24781/chapter/1 [https://perma.cc/UU6K-MVTX].  
 33.   “Overprescribing” appears three times without definition. ASPEN INST. HEALTH STRATEGY 
GRP., CONFRONTING OUR NATION’S OPIOID CRISIS (2017), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/ 
content/uploads/2018/01/AHSG-Final-Report-2017_compressed-2.pdf?_ga=2.125457098.15130239 
05.1550708071-877169743.1550708071 [https://perma.cc/CM9T-8FJH].  Inappropriate prescribing 
appears once and implicitly means patients obtaining medication in different states—an issue that 
really does not implicate prescribing behavior unless the prescribers have access to information from 
other states.  Id. at 15. 
 34.   A search of Westlaw, Lexis, JSTOR, Google Scholar, and Google for “overprescri!”, “over-
prescri!”, “inappropriate prescribing”, “inappropriate prescription”, and “misprescri!” garnered a 
variety of results but the terms were used throughout articles, laws, policy documents, and news reports 
without explicit definitions.  For example, Nevada Assembly Bill 474 (enacted in 2017), includes the 
term “inappropriate prescribing” fifteen times.  Assemb. B. 474, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017).  
No definitions are provided.  Id.  Washington State has an extremely comprehensive set of medical 
board regulations around opioid prescribing but does not define overprescribing or inappropriate 
prescribing.  See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-919-852 (2019). 
 35.   See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
CMS-2017-0163, ADVANCE NOTICE OF METHODOLOGICAL CHANGES FOR CALENDAR YEAR (CY) 
2019 FOR MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (MA) CAPITATION RATES, PART C AND PART D PAYMENT 
POLICIES AND 2019 DRAFT CALL LETTER (Feb. 1, 2018),  https://www.regulations.gov/ 
contentStreamer?documentId=CMS-2017-0163-0007&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/X5Q4-
CFXH] (“inappropriate prescribe”, “inappropriate prescribing”, and “inappropriate prescription” do 
not appear, “overprescribing” appears once in reference to an FDA policy without definition, 
“misprescribe” and “misprescribing” do not appear, “opioid overutilization” appears without 
definition but its implied meaning is based on daily morphine milligram equivalents only). 
 36.   This includes patients with SUDs, chronic pain, serious mental illness, and other common 
comorbid conditions.  For a more detailed discussion, see Dineen, supra note 27, at 19–29.   
 37.   For a discussion of the role of law or perceived law on norms and behavior, see Frederick 
Schauer, Awash in a Sea of Norms, in THE FORCE OF LAW (2015).  
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overreaction to policy is not limited to providers.  For example, third party 
payors overcorrected in response to the Center for Medicare Medicaid 
Services’ (CMS’s) guidance to utilize safety warnings for higher doses of 
opioids.  CMS noted: 
[W]e believed that some sponsors implemented these edits beyond their 
intended use . . . . [They] are not intended as a means to implement a 
prescribing limit or apply additional clinical criteria for the use of 
opioids, but instead to give physicians important additional information 
about their patients’ opioid use.38 
Policymakers and prescribers deserve better and more information as to 
what inappropriate prescribing means. 
This article focuses on opioid prescribing policy and, in particular, on 
the lack of shared definitions for inappropriate prescribing—a kind of 
linguistic uncertainty.39  Even after a century of concern about provider 
roles in recommending or prescribing certain medications,40 inappropriate 
prescribing is about as well defined as hardcore pornography—we know 
it when we see it.41  The lack of definitions in this area was recently noticed 
by federal lawmakers, who added one provision in the Support for Patients 
and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act).42  That provision directs the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop a definition of 
inappropriate prescribing—although it would apply only to new reporting 
by Medicare Advantage plans to HHS.43  Although quite limited, this 
represents the first acknowledgement in law or policy that defining 
inappropriate prescribing is a necessary antecedent for sanctioning it. 
                                                          
 38.   CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 35, at 209; see also Kao-Ping Chua 
et al., Opioid Prescribing Limits for Acute Pain Potential Problems with Design and Implementation, 
321 JAMA 643, 644 (2019) (describing a situation in Michigan in which the state law limits initial 
dose for acute pain to 7 days but the largest insurer limits the supply to 5 days). 
 39.   See, e.g., Arnulf Grubler et al., Coping with Uncertainties-Examples of Modeling 
Approaches at IIASA, 98 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 213, 215 (2015) 
(“Linguistic uncertainty refers to vagueness or ambiguity in defining the nature and boundary 
conditions of a particular decision problem at hand . . . .”).  
 40.   For a brief history of prescribing regulation in the United States, see generally Timothy 
Atkinson et al., Opioid Medications: Old Wine in New Bottles, in PRESCRIPTION DRUG DIVERSION 
AND PAIN: HISTORY, POLICY, AND TREATMENT 1 (John F. Peppin, John J. Coleman, Kelly K. Dineen, 
and Adam J. Ruggles eds., 2018).  
 41.   Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (describing the limit 
of constitutional protection of free expression as “hardcore pornography,” defined only as “I know it 
when I see it.”).  
 42.   Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for 
Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. 115-271, 132 Stat. 3894 (2018). 
 43.   Id. § 6063(b)(5)(C)(i) (“[T]he Secretary shall, pursuant to rulemaking—specify a definition 
for the term ‘inappropriate prescribing’ and a method for determining if a provider of services 
prescribes inappropriate prescribing.”). 
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This article will provide guidance on this issue by offering a taxonomy 
for inappropriate opioid prescribing that is meant to serve as a kind of 
public choice architecture to reduce decision making errors by policy 
makers,44 as well as a debiasing strategy for providers.45  Part II includes 
a brief background of the history of recent prescribing policies and 
examines their impact on opioid related harms.  Part III reviews the ways 
in which policy makers and providers may be prone to decision making 
errors, identifies and describes the failed misprescribing heuristic, and 
reviews existing definitions of inappropriate prescribing.  Part IV sets out 
a proposed taxonomy for inappropriate prescribing. In turn, each of the 
categories will be explained and examined in light of existing empirical 
research on opioid related harms as well as the possible benefits of existing 
policies to reduce harms in each category.  The modest goal of this 
taxonomy is that it may help guide policymakers to evaluate and craft 
better prescribing policy, enhance the predictability and consistency of 
legal scrutiny of prescribing, and mitigate overreaction by prescribers. 
II. THE OPIOID RELATED PUBLIC HEALTH CRISES & PRESCRIPTION 
OPIOID POLICY 
The U.S. is experiencing record levels of morbidity and mortality 
related to opioids (both prescription and illicit drugs such as heroin and 
illicitly manufactured fentanyl) as well as other drugs—both prescription 
and illicit.46  Drug related morbidity and mortality overlays and intertwines 
with alarming rates of serious mental illness, suicidality, and chronic 
pain—all of which are situated in the context of widespread social, 
cultural, and structural inequities.47  The root causes of the crisis, or crises, 
                                                          
 44.   See, e.g., Adam C. Smith, Utilizing Behavioral Insights (Without Romance): An Inquiry into 
the Choice Architecture of Public Decision-Making, 82 MO. L. REV. 737 (2017) (arguing that 
“improvement of private choice architecture must be accompanied by careful understanding of public 
choice architecture in which policies are rendered if behavioral economics is to be a successful 
foundation for welfare improving policies.”). 
 45.   See, e.g., Pat Croskerry, Cognitive Forcing Strategies in Clinical Decisionmaking, 41 
ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 110 (2003) (describing “cognitive forcing strategies,” i.e., “cognitive 
debiasing” means for avoiding diagnostic errors). 
 46.   See Mathew V. Kiang et al., Assessment of Changes in the Geographical Distribution of 
Opioid-Related Mortality Across the United States by Opioid Type, 1999-2016, JAMA NETWORK 
OPEN, Feb. 2019, https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.0040 [https://perma.cc/E3UJ-
SBMJ] (conducting a cross-sectional analysis of all opioid related mortality between 1999 and 2016 
by geography and type of opioid involved).  See also Leo Beletsky & Corey Davis, Today’s Fentanyl 
Crisis: Prohibition’s Iron Law, Revisited, 46 INT’L J. DRUG POLICY 156, 156–59 (2017). 
 47.   See generally Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and 
Economic Determinants, 108 AJPH 182 (2018) (describing the various public health crises and 
explanatory models). 
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are myriad and multifactorial.48  The solutions will need to be myriad and 
multifactorial as well. 
A. Prescription opioid policies 
There is no question that opioid related harms in the midst of multiple, 
overlapping health crises are significant.49  Careless and sometimes 
criminal prescribing contributed to the harms,50 as did aggressive and even 
criminal practices by drug manufacturers,51 and a laundry list of 
concurrent factors.52  At the same time, prescription opioids are neither 
inherently good nor evil.  They are essential for the treatment of some 
types of acute pain,53 necessary to relieve the suffering of patients with 
pain from active cancer and many terminal conditions, and a critical tool 
in the treatment of many chronic primary and secondary pain conditions,54 
including those that resulted from prior cancer treatments.55  In fact, 
despite widespread rhetoric, there remains “insufficient evidence to either 
support or refute the efficacy of high-dose opioids in chronic non-cancer 
pain.”56  A recent review article found small but statistically significant 
                                                          
 48.   See generally Leo Beletsky, 21st Century Cures for the Opioid Crisis: Promise, Impact, and 
Missed Opportunities, 44 AM. J.L. & MED. 359 (2018) (providing a comprehensive overview of the 
complexity of the opioid related public health crises and evaluating the 21st Century Cures Act in light 
of existing causes and harms). 
 49.   See id. at 359–71.  
 50.   See, e.g., James M. DuBois et al., A Mixed-Method Analysis of Reports on 100 Cases of 
Improper Prescribing of Controlled Substances, 46 J. DRUG ISSUES 457, 457–59 (2016); Stacey A. 
Tovino, Fraud, Abuse, and Opioids, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 901 (2019) (describing the use of fraud and 
abuse laws to sanction prescribing behavior motivated by personal gain rather than patient well-being).  
 51.   See, e.g., Scott E. Hadland et al., Association of Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing of 
Opioid Products with Mortality from Opioid-Related Overdoses, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, FEB. 2019, 
at 1, 2, 8–9, https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2018.6007 [https://perma.cc/D5AW-PW2U]; 
BETH MACY, DOPESICK: DEALERS, DOCTORS, AND THE DRUG COMPANY THAT ADDICTED AMERICA 
(2018).  
 52.   See generally SUSAN M. ADAMS ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. OF MED., FIRST DO NO HARM: 
MARSHALLING CLINICAL LEADERSHIP TO COUNTER THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC 7–9 (2017) (discussing the 
drivers of the opioid epidemic).  
 53.   See, e.g., Richard D. Blondell et al., Pharmacological Therapy for Acute Pain, 87 AM. 
FAMILY PHYSICIAN 766, 770–71 (2013) (discussing how opioids may be properly and effectively 
prescribed, according to the World Health Organization pain relief ladder, if acetaminophen, aspirin, 
or other NSAIDs are insufficient to control pain). 
 54.   One example too often left out of any discourse on opioid policy is the use of opioids in the 
treatment of sickle cell disease.  See, e.g., Kelly K. Dineen, Opioid Prescribing in Special Populations, 
in PRESCRIPTION DRUG DIVERSION AND PAIN, supra note 40, at 190.  
 55.   For an excellent discussion of the evaluation and treatment of patients with chronic pain, see 
generally John F. Peppin et al., Evaluation and Treatment of the Chronic Pain Patient, in 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG DIVERSION AND PAIN, supra note 40, at 110. 
 56.   Charl Els et al., High Dose Opioids for Chronic Non-Cancer Pain: An Overview of 
Cochrane Reviews, COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMIC REVIEWS, Oct. 2018, at 7, 
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improvements in pain, sleep quality, and physical function with the use of 
chronic opioid therapy (COT) in some groups;57 however, the media 
widely reported that the study showed that opioids do not help at all.58  At 
the same time, patients on higher doses of opioids have a greater risk of 
unintentional poisoning,59 a risk that must be taken into account by 
prescribers.60  Chronic opioid prescribing has decreased dramatically since 
2012, with a particularly sharp decrease in daily MME after the release of 
the CDC Guideline.61 
In response to rising rates of opioid related morbidity and mortality 
after 2000, opioid prescribing laws and policies proliferated.  Earliest in 
the response were laws directed at chronic pain treatment with opioids.  
Some states enacted new requirements aimed at curbing “pill mills,” which 
are criminal operations often set up as pain treatment clinics.62 Pain 
                                                          
https://doi.org//10.1002/14651858.CD012299.pub2 [https://perma.cc/B4KM-GU7P]. 
 57.   Jason W. Busse et al., Opioids for Chronic Noncancer Pain: A Systematic Review and Meta-
analysis, 320 JAMA 2448, 2453 (2018).  
 58.   See, e.g., Marlene Lenthang, New Study Finds Opioids DON’T Work Well for Chronic Pain 
Despite Millions of Americans Being Prescribed the Drug that Kills 115 People a Day, DAILY MAIL 
(Dec. 19, 2018, 1:23 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6512875/New-study-finds-
opioids-I-work-chronic-pains.html [https://perma.cc/Y5VF-FGA4]; Rachel Rettner, Opioids Don’t 
Really Do That Much for Chronic Pain, Meta-Analysis Finds, LIVE SCI. (Dec. 18, 2018, 11:17 AM), 
https://www.livescience.com/64329-opioids-chronic-pain.html [https://perma.cc/735Y-4859].  But 
see Amy Norton, Opioids May Help Chronic Pain, But Not Much, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 
18, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2018-12-18/opioids-may-
help-chronic-pain-but-not-much (acknowledging the findings that there was statistically significant 
benefit for some patients).  
 59.   I use the word poisoning intentionally because of the inaccuracy of the term overdose and 
its stigmatizing effect.  See Edward Xie et al., Updating Our Language Around Substance Use 
Disorders, 189 CMAJ E1566, E1566 (2017) (“The term ‘overdose’ connotes personal failure and 
responsibility, and is a remnant of the old psychosocial model of addiction.  This term suggests that 
the patient a) knows the nature of the substance taken and b) has taken more than what she or he was 
tolerant to or intended to take.  ‘Overdose’ also implies that there is a correct dose, when none exists 
for use of illicit formulations. . . . [W]e suggest that the more precise terms ‘poisoning’ or 
‘intoxication’ should be used. . . . With these more accurate terms, providers may be cued to consider 
and address the two separate health needs present: acute poisoning or intoxication, and the contributory 
conditions: uncontrolled pain, mental illness, drug dependence or addiction, etc.”).   
 60.   See Adeleke D. Adewumi et al., Prescribed Dose of Opioids and Overdose: A Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis of Unintentional Prescription Opioid Overdose, 32 CNS DRUGS 101, 115 
(2018) (“Our study found that chronic users and outpatients are at increased risk of unintentional 
prescription opioid over-dose.  Furthermore, we found that the risk of accidental prescription opioid 
overdose events becomes apparent from doses as low as 20 MME/day, and there is a dose–response 
effect relationship between unintentional prescription opioid overdose events and the prescribed dose 
of opioid analgesic. Therefore, caution should be exercised when patients are prescribed doses above 
20 MME/day.”). 
 61.   See Amy S.B. Bohnert et al., Opioid Prescribing in the United States Before and After the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 2016 Opioid Guideline, 169 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
367, 368 (2018). 
 62.   See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, MENU OF PAIN MANAGEMENT CLINIC 
REGULATION, intro.–1 (2012)  https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/menu-pmcr.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
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management practices were often collateral damage in these efforts, as 
many pain management specialists left the specialty or the state because 
of the significant new regulatory requirements and fear of enhanced 
scrutiny.63  Other states focused directly on the use of opioids for chronic 
pain only and directed regulatory agencies to set prescribing rules as early 
as 2010.64  States enacted or enhanced Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs (PDMPs), with more focus on mandatory enrollment of patients 
receiving prescriptions and requiring prescribers to access PDMPs before 
prescribing.65  Beginning in 2016, states passed legislation aimed at 
limiting prescribing of opioids in acute pain as well.66  Criminal 
investigations of prescribers also increased substantially, as did 
professional board scrutiny.67 
                                                          
XUA8-PS3P]; Barbara Andraka-Christou et al., Pain Clinic Definitions in the Medical Literature and 
U.S. State Laws: an Integrative Systematic Review and Comparison, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 
PREVENTION & POL’Y, Dec. 2018, at 1, 8–9, https://doi.org/10.1186/s13011-018-0153-6 
[https://perma.cc/HJQ6-CJZ6]. 
 63.   See, e.g., Gary W. Jay, So Patients Suffer—It’s for Their Own Good!!!, 22 AM. J. 
THERAPEUTICS 80 (2015) (describing unintended consequences of opioid prescribing regulation); 
Terrence McCoy, ‘Unintended Consequences:’ Inside The Fallout Of America’s Crackdown On 
Opioids, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/impact-
of-americas-opioid-crackdown/?utm_term=.323a9f16bdbc [https://perma.cc/ZM3V-JXQ6] (“[S]ome 
physicians, fearful of the financial and legal peril in prescribing opioids, and newly aware of their 
hazards, have stopped prescribing them altogether.”); Matthew Torres, Concerns Mount Over Pain 
Clinic Closures In Tennessee, NEWS CHANNEL 5 NASHVILLE (July 6, 2018, 9:51 PM), 
https://www.newschannel5.com/news/concerns-mount-over-pain-clinic-closures-in-tennessee 
[https://perma.cc/D65N-2L3B].  Those that stayed in practice did decrease their daily opioid 
prescribing modestly, especially in patients at the highest daily dose.  See Lainie Rutkow et al., Effect 
of Florida’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program and Pill Mill Laws on Opioid Prescribing and 
Use, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1642, 1642 (2015).  
 64.   For example, Washington state has been especially aggressive in regulating opioids.  They 
began in 2010 by directing medical quality assurance to repeal all existing rules regarding chronic pain 
management and issue new rules.  See, e.g., Wash. St. Reg. 11-12-025 (Jan. 2, 2012).  
 65.   There is a long history of prescription monitoring by states, but the use of computer or 
electronic surveillance began in the 1990s. For a full discussion of PDMPs, see John J. Coleman, 
Monitoring Prescriptions, Third Party Healthcare Payers, Prescription Benefit Managers, and 
Private-Sector Policy Options, in PRESCRIPTION DRUG DIVERSION AND PAIN, supra note 40, at 39. 
For a modern take on evaluating PDMPs, see Rebecca L. Haffajee, Preventing Opioid Misuse with 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: A Framework for Evaluating the Success of State Public 
Health Laws, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1621, 1634–87 (2016). 
 66.   See, e.g., Prescribing Policies: States Confront Opioid Overdose Epidemic, NCSL (Oct. 31, 
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/prescribing-policies-states-confront-opioid-overdose-
epidemic.aspx [https://perma.cc/HEE3-5YBX]. The harms of prescribing too many pills for acute 
pain, resulting in large numbers of leftover pills that are available for misuse and diversion were well 
known to public health authorities since at least 2007, but it took nearly ten years to take any action at 
all on this.  See Kelly K. Dineen, supra note 27, at 47–73. 
 67.   See, e.g., Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can 
Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 7, 12 (2016).  See generally Health Care Compliance Ass’n, M.D.s are ‘Spooked’ by Scrutiny 
of Opioid Prescribing; Documentation Is Best Defense, REP. ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE, July 31, 
2017, at 1, 1. 
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Opioid related harms were addressed at the federal level, including 
three recent federal laws: the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act 
of 2016 (CARA),68 the 21st Century Cures Act,69 and the SUPPORT Act.70  
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enacted a Risk Evaluation and 
Mitigation Strategy (REMS) for prescription opioids71 and engaged in 
numerous regulatory strategies to address opioid related harms.72 The 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) tightened criteria for drug quotas 
related to opioids.73 The Department of Justice and other federal agencies 
have increased prosecutions against health care organizations and 
individual providers.74 
B. Fewer prescriptions, greater harms? 
As existing laws and provider reactions have cut the prescription 
opioid supply, persons with SUDs increasingly turn to other prescription 
drug classes (such as benzodiazepines)75 and more dangerous illicit 
                                                          
 68.   Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-198, 130 Stat. 695 
(2016).  
 69.   21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).  For an excellent 
discussion of the 21st Century Cures Act, see generally Beletsky, supra note 48.  
 70.   Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for 
Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, 132 Stat. 3894 (2018). 
 71.   U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGY (REMS) 
DOCUMENT (2012), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/rems/Opioid_Analgesic_ 
2018_09_18_REMS_Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/76XK-5279].  
 72.   For a complete list of FDA actions from 1911 through present, see Timeline of Selected FDA 
Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and Abuse, FDA.GOV 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm338566.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4GP6-3R5S] (last updated Feb. 13, 2019). 
 73.   See, e.g., Press Release, Drug Enf’t Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, DEA Propose Significant 
Opioid Manufacturing Reduction in 2019 (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.dea.gov/press-
releases/2018/08/16/justice-department-dea-propose-significant-opioid-manufacturing-reduction 
[https://perma.cc/68PN-UXCG]. The SUPPORT Act further tightens the DEA’s evaluation of quotas.  
Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and 
Communities Act § 3282. 
 74.   See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office S. Dist. of Ga., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
National Health Care Fraud Takedown Results in Charges Nationwide and in the Southern District of 
Georgia (June 28, 2018),  https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdga/pr/national-health-care-fraud-takedown-
results-charges-across-country-and-southern [https://perma.cc/T5CW-MT9W]. See generally 
Tovino, supra note 50 (carefully documenting and analyzing the uptick in government enforcement 
actions involving the federal Anti-Kickback Statute and the federal civil False Claims Act in opioid 
cases).  
 75.   The coprescribing rate of benzodiazepines with opioids quadrupled between 2003 and 2015, 
despite evidence of their relationship to opioid related overdoses. Sumit D. Argawal & Bruce E. 
Landon, Patterns in Outpatient Benzodiazepine Prescribing in the United States, JAMA NETWORK 
OPEN, Jan. 2019, at 1, 6–7 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2018.7399 
[https://perma.cc/458Y-K6BF].  
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drugs.76  As such, drug poisoning morbidity and mortality continues to 
climb, with illicit substances—such as heroin, illicitly manufactured 
fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamines—playing an increasing role.77  
Recent research by Cicero and colleagues reveals that heroin is now a 
more common substance of initiation than prescription opioids;78 
moreover, of those who developed an OUD after receiving prescription 
opioids from a prescriber (iatrogenic addiction), a significant majority had 
a previous history of substance misuse.79  Even a small percentage of 
people who develop iatrogenic addiction is too many—however, policy 
efforts should focus proportionately on the sources of harm.  To date, 
disproportionate amounts of media and public policy attention focuses on 
prescription opioids, primarily in the treatment of chronic pain.  A 
framework for inappropriate prescribing might help make policy efforts 
and evaluation more proportionate to the harms. 
Since the release of the Drug Abuse Warning Network data in 2013, 
an array of legal and policy initiatives around opioid prescribing were 
implemented;80 however, they have done little to reduce overall morbidity 
and mortality.81  A recent study by Chen and colleagues used a systems 
dynamic model to predict the impact of prescribing policies on opioid 
related mortality through 2025.  They concluded that those policies have, 
at best, a modest impact.82  According to the authors, their findings 
“highlight the limitations of preventing prescription opioid misuse alone, 
and the need to use multiple policy levers simultaneously . . . to alter the 
projected course of the opioid overdose crisis in the coming years.”83 
Some prescribing policies address the harms associated with opioids 
                                                          
 76.   For example, benzodiazepine poisonings have increased substantially, while prescription 
opioid poisonings have stabilized. Overdose Death Rates, NIH.GOV, https://www.drugabuse.gov/ 
related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc/258Y-DT4L] (last update Jan. 
2019). 
 77.   Id.  
 78.   Theodore J. Cicero et al., Increased Use of Heroin as an Initiating Opioid of Abuse: Further 
Considerations and Policy Implications, 87 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 267, 269 (2018). 
 79.   Theodore J. Cicero et al., Psychoactive Substance Use Prior to the Development of 
Iatrogenic Opioid Abuse: A Descriptive Analysis of Treatment-Seeking Opioid Abusers, 65 
ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 242, 242–44 (2017).  
 80.   See generally Andraka-Christou et al., supra note 62 (surveying state regulations on 
opioids); Corey Davis et al., supra note 9 (conducting a national survey and identifying themes of state 
laws limiting prescriptions through 2017).  
 81.   See, e.g., Dasgupta et al., supra note 47, at 183. 
 82.   Qiushi Chen et al., Prevention of Prescription Opioid Misuse and Projected Overdose 
Deaths in the United States, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Feb. 2019, at 1, 4–8, https://doi.org/10.1001/ 
jamanetworkopen.2018.7621 [https://perma.cc/W34Q-JT7M]. 
 83.   Id. at 8.  
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in isolation, incompletely, or out of proportion to the existing evidence.84  
Others are simply bad—they don’t address the harms they purport to and 
they force providers to act against the interests of their patients.85 Even 
well-crafted policies, including much of the CDC Guideline, can be 
harmful as interpreted and implemented by enforcement agencies, 
providers, or health care organizations.86  A recent expert consensus panel 
emphasized the need for clarification to both policymakers and providers, 
saying, 
The period following guideline release has seen clinical and policy issues 
that may have gone beyond what was originally intended by developers 
of the guideline.  In particular, the appropriate role of regulatory and 
policymaking bodies, including public and private payers, requires 
clarification.  The guideline was not meant to be prescriptive but, at 
times, has been implemented without flexibility, perhaps without full 
awareness of the guideline’s precise content and intent.87 
State laws that restrict and surveil opioid prescribing have produced 
predictable but unintended consequences, some of which we are only 
beginning to realize.88  These laws have mostly taken the form of supply-
side restrictions, focusing too narrowly on prescription opioids alone and 
ignoring significant issues of concurrent use of other drugs and substances, 
the consequences of abrupt discontinuation of opioids, and access to 
treatment for OUDs.89 In a 2019 systematic review of state prescribing 
laws, Davis and colleagues explained: 
While we assume these laws to be well-intentioned, it is not clear 
whether they will be effective in reducing opioid-related harm, and it is 
possible that they will increase preventable suffering among some 
individuals by leaving pain untreated or encouraging some individuals 
with opioid use disorder to transition from [prescription opioids] to 
                                                          
 84.   See, e.g., Kelly K. Dineen, Defining Misprescribing to Inform Prescription Opioid Policy, 
HASTINGS CTR. REP., July–Aug. 2018, at 1, 5–6; Kelly K. Dineen, supra note 27, at 8–19. 
 85.   Sandra H. Johnson calls these “the rules are wrong” type of bad law claims.  Sandra H. 
Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law Claims” Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS 
L.J. 973, 1005–06 (2009).  
 86.   One example is payors or state lawmakers setting a daily morphine equivalent for all 
patients, even though those limits are completely incorrect for medication assisted treatment for 
OUDs.  See AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT ON MORPHINE 
EQUIVALENT UNITS/MORPHINE MILLIGRAM EQUIVALENTS (2016), https://www.asam.org/docs/ 
default-source/public-policy-statements/2016-statement-on-morphine-equivalent-units-morphine-
milligram-equivalents.pdf?sfvrsn=3bc177c2_6 [https://perma.cc/4DKS-4BP3].  For an excellent 
description of various bad law claims, see Johnson, supra note 85.  
 87.   Kurt Kroenke et al., supra note 9, at 3 (emphasis added).  
 88.   See, e.g., Beletsky & Davis, supra note 46. 
 89.   Id. 
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potentially more dangerous illicit substances.90 
Scott Hadland and Leo Beletsky went further, stating, 
[E]ven as policymakers pursue additional regulatory approaches to 
reduce opioid prescribing—including prescription drug monitoring 
programs, dose or duration limits on prescriptions, and prescriber 
sanctions, among others—the overdose crisis will likely worsen so long 
as supply side interventions are not coupled with evidence based 
measures to cut demand and reduce harm.91 
Concerns that some prescribing policies are causing more harm are 
supported by recent findings.  A decade ago, most of the opioid related 
morbidity and mortality involved prescription opioids, but as policy efforts 
have compressed their availability, illicit opioids are now more often 
implicated.  This reality is obscured by the traditional reporting that counts 
illicitly manufactured fentanyl deaths along with prescription opioid 
related deaths, more than doubling the number attributed to prescription 
opioids from 17,087 to 32,445 in 2016, for example.92  A 2018 modeling 
study by Pitt and colleagues evaluated the impact of eleven policy 
interventions on opioid mortality and concluded that many of those 
directed at prescribing “may reduce prescription opioid misuse but 
increase heroin use, blunting or even eliminating any public health benefit 
in the short term.”93  Even in the long term, only efforts to reduce acute 
and transitioning pain prescribing resulted in any projected reductions in 
opioid related deaths.94  In 2019, Chen and colleagues concluded, 
We found that under current conditions the opioid overdose crisis is 
likely to substantially worsen and that interventions such as prescription 
drug monitoring programs are unlikely to lead to major decreases in the 
number of deaths from opioid overdose in the near future.  Given these 
findings, policymakers will need to take a stronger and multipronged 
approach, such as improving access to treatment, expanding harm-
reduction interventions, and lowering exposure to illicit opioids, to curb 
                                                          
 90.   Davis et al., supra at note 9, at 170 (emphasis added).  
 91.   Scott E. Hadland & Leo Beletsky, Tighter Prescribing Regulations Drive Illicit Opioid 
Sales, BMJ, June 13, 2018, at 1, 2, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k2480 [https://perma.cc/4KHX-
FGXC]. 
 92.   See Puja Seth et al., Quantifying the Epidemic of Prescription Opioid Overdose Deaths, 108 
AJPH 500, 500 (2018).  
 93.   Allison L. Pitt, Keith Humphreys, & Margaret L. Brandeau, Modeling Health Benefits and 
Harms of Public Policy Responses to the US Opioid Epidemic, 108 AJPH 1394, 1396–99 (2018) 
(separately evaluating reductions in acute pain prescribing, chronic pain prescribing, transitioning pain 
prescribing, PDMPs, and drug rescheduling and finding that only acute pain and transitioning pain 
prescribing-reduction policies reduced mortality at all at either 5 or 10 years).  
 94.   Id. 
2019 DEFINITIONS MATTER 977 
the trajectory of the opioid overdose epidemic in the United States.95 
The reasons that opioid policies sometimes do not address underlying 
issues, or even cause more harm than good, are complex.96  Some policies 
likely fell prey to the intentions heuristic (i.e. the implicit privileging of a 
policy’s good intentions over the actual consequences).97  Some policies 
are based on simple misunderstanding and miscommunication of the 
evidence.98  Fundamentally, policy makers are prone to the same biases 
and decision making errors as individuals, which may contribute to 
incoherent policy enactments. 
III. OPIOID RELATED DECISIONS: FAILED HEURISTICS & BIASES 
The opioid crisis is too often explained in oversimplified narratives 
and sound bites.  Every decision about opioids is wrapped in robust 
cultural, moral, and political narratives about the meaning and value of 
pain and suffering, the nature of addiction, the relationship of the practice 
of medicine to the treatment of addiction, and the state sanctioned 
stigmatization of substance use through criminalization.  These factors 
make stakeholders involved in opioid prescribing policies more 
susceptible to bias and faulty decision making.99  “[A]s behavioral agents 
                                                          
 95.   Chen et al., supra note 82, at 10 (emphasis added). 
 96.   One reason may be an adherence to the Precautionary Principle, i.e., that “regulators should 
take steps to protect against potential harms, even if causal chains are unclear and even if we do not 
know that those harms will come to fruition,” which Cass Sunstein has described as “literally 
incoherent” and providing an “illusion of guidance” only. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: 
BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 4–5 (2005). 
 97.   See, e.g., Gary M. Lucas, Jr. & Slavisa Tasic, Behavioral Public Choice and the Law, 118 
W. VA. L. REV. 199, 218–23 (2015). 
 98.   For example, the media and policymakers continue to spread a narrative in which those 
harmed by opioids are people who received a prescription from their provider.  See, e.g., Painkillers 
Driving Addiction, Overdose, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, https://www.nsc.org/home-safety/safety-
topics/opioids [https://perma.cc/688N-4EX3] (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (“Many adults [are] 
prescribed opioids by doctors and subsequently become addicted or move from pills to heroin.”); 
Controlled Substances Quotas, 83 Fed. Reg. 17,329, 17,331 (proposed Apr. 19, 2018) (codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 1303) (“Users may be initiated into a life of substance abuse and dependency after first 
obtaining these drugs from their health care providers or without cost from the family medicine cabinet 
or from friends.  Once ensnared, dependency on potent and dangerous street drugs may ensue.  About 
80% of heroin users first misused prescription opioids.”).  In reality, this is untrue. Approximately 
75% of those who report misuse of prescription opioids did not receive a prescription for the 
medication—instead they steal, borrow, or buy the drugs. See, e.g., Rachel Lapari & Arthur Hughes, 
How People Obtain the Prescription Pain Relievers They Misuse, SAMHSA.GOV (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/report_2686/ShortReport-2686.html 
[https://perma.cc/XC7M-KB5R]. 
 99.   See Dineen, supra note 27, at 32–46 (applying interdisciplinary literature on decision 
making to providers and policymakers in Section III); see also JUSTIN PARKHURST, THE POLITICS OF 
EVIDENCE 84–104 (2017), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/68604/1/Parkhurst_The%20Politics%20of% 
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themselves, policymakers and regulators are subject to the same 
psychological biases and limitations as all individuals.”100  The propensity 
for decision making errors by policy makers may be compounded by 
public pressures.101  Measures are needed to assist policy makers that 
correct for bias in implementing and evaluating opioid prescribing 
policies.102  A taxonomy of inappropriate prescribing might serve as a type 
of public choice architecture or forcing strategy for policy makers.103 
Providers are also prone to errors in decision-making.104  No other 
decisions in medicine risk such a breadth of legal scrutiny as opioid 
prescribing, which elicits fear and avoidance.105  Further, the conditions of 
uncertainty surrounding prescribing, the treatment of pain, the separation 
of the treatment of SUDs from the rest of medicine and health care, and 
the long history of stigmatization of opioid related populations all 
contribute to decision making errors. These factors also fuel strong—and 
usually negative—emotional reactions, which further heighten the risk of 
disproportionate and even harmful decisions by providers and policy 
makers.106 
                                                          
20Evidence.pdf [https://perma.cc/2354-LJBG] (“Here we particularly draw on the field of cognitive 
psychology to explore the ways in which common, yet often unconscious, mental processes may also 
induce technical and issue bias. As will be shown, many of these instances can be directly linked to 
our existing values and beliefs, thus making them political in origin.”). 
 100.   W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Behavioral Public Choice: The Behavioral Paradox of 
Government Policy, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 973, 977 (2015) (“Many, although certainly not all, 
behavioral economics papers focus on the biases and heuristics of ordinary individuals, while 
seemingly ignoring that regulators are people too and thus subject to the same psychological forces.”). 
 101.   Id. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 
1826 (2013) (“Official action may fail to respect heterogeneity, may diminish learning and self-help, 
may be subject to pressures from self-interested private groups (the problem of “behavioral public 
choice”), and may reflect the same errors that ordinary persons make.”). 
 102.   Most of the legal literature focuses in libertarian paternalism, which includes organizing 
choice architecture in policy to enhance the decisions of those subject to the laws.  However, public 
choice architecture expands that approach to the decisions of policymakers.  See Thomas A. 
Lambert, Two Mistakes Behavioralists Make: A Response to Professors Feigenson et al. and Professor 
Slovic, 69 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1053 (2004); Smith, supra note 44, at 737–41. 
 103.   Enhancing choice architecture may improve decisions by reducing bias and correcting for 
decision-making errors.  See, e.g., Megan S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The Case for 
Relational Nudges in End-of-Life Decision-Making Law and Policy, 77 MD. L. REV. 1062 (2018) 
(reviewing choice architecture and applying behavioral economics to end of life decision-making).  In 
the medical literature, a type of debiasing strategy is a forcing strategy, which is intended to force 
actors into Systems II thinking and reduce the influence of bias.  See, e.g., Pat Croskerry, supra note 
45, at 115 (“[C]ognitive forcing strategies are a specific debiasing technique that introduces self-
monitoring of decisionmaking”). 
 104.   I have more comprehensively analyzed this problem in a previous article.  An in-depth 
discussion is outside the scope of this article. Dineen, supra note 27, at 32–46 (Section III).   
 105.   See, e.g., Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67, at 13. 
 106.   See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 96, at 66–85 (discussing the effect of probability neglect 
and emotions on judgment and decision making); see also W. Kip Viscusia & Ted Gayer, Behavioral 
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A. Dual Process Models of Decision-Making, Errors, & Mitigation 
Strategies 
Dual process theories (DPT) of decision-making are ubiquitous across 
disciplines.107  DPT divides decisions into intuitive (System 1) and 
analytical (System 2) poles on a continuum.108  Neither type is inherently 
superior—both are essential to decision making.109  System 1 occupies the 
majority of our decision-making efforts, in part because of its efficiency.110  
System 1 functions largely through the use of rules of thumb or heuristics 
that ignore part of the information presented to streamline decision-
making, but these heuristics can fail and result in poor decisions because 
of bias and cognitive error,111 a focus of much of the work that began in 
earnest with Tversky and Kahneman.112  On the other hand, heuristics can 
effectively simplify decisions and even enhance them in some 
                                                          
Public Choice: The Behavioral Paradox of Government Policy, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 973, 977 
(2015) (“Many, although certainly not all, behavioral economics papers focus on the biases and 
heuristics of ordinary individuals, while seemingly ignoring that regulators are people too and thus 
subject to the same psychological forces.”). 
 107.   See, e.g., Ed O’Sullivan & SJ Schofield, Cognitive Bias in Clinical Medicine, 48 J. ROYAL 
C. PHYSICIANS EDINBURGH 225, 225–28 (2018), https://www.rcpe.ac.uk/sites/default/files/ 
jrcpe_48_3_osullivan.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SNP-EDW6] (discussing “the potential origins of bias 
based on ‘dual process thinking’”); Pat Croskerry, Clinical Cognition and Diagnostic Error: 
Applications of a Dual Process Model of Reasoning, 14 ADVANCES HEALTH SCI. EDUC. 27, 27 (2009) 
(“[Dual Process Theory] has  immediate  application  to medical decision making and provides an 
overall schema for understanding the variety of theoretical approaches that have been taken in the past. 
The model has important practical applications for decision making across the multiple domains of 
healthcare, and may be used as a template for teaching decision theory, as well as a platform for future 
research. Importantly, specific operating characteristics of the model explain how diagnostic failure 
occurs.”); Sunstein, supra note 101, at 1886 (applying Dual Process Theory to issues of autonomy and 
paternalism); Adele Diederich & Jennifer S. Trueblood, A Dynamic Dual Process Model of Risky 
Decision Making, 125 PSYCH. REV. 270, 270 (2018). 
 108.   The two types are described in many ways. Type 1 is described as fast, efficient, systems 1, 
heuristic, autonomous, impulsive, unconscious, and experiential; Type 2 is described as slow, systems 
2, deliberative, voluntary, metacognitive, reflective, and rational.  See Diederich & Trueblood, supra 
note 107, at 271; Carissa Bonner & Ben R. Newell, In Conflict with Ourselves? An Investigation of 
Heuristic and Analytic Processes in Decision Making, 38 MEMORY & COGNITION 186, 186 (2010); 
Antonio Filippin & Fracesco Guala, Group Identity as a Social Heuristic: An Experiment with 
Reaction Times, 10 J. NEUROSCIENCE PSYCHOL. & ECON. 153, 154 (2017); Dineen, supra note 2735–
36.  For an excellent visual representation of the continuum, see Croskerry, supra note 107, at 28 
(figure 1).  
 109.   See, e.g., Croskerry, supra note 107, at 28.  
 110.   Croskerry refers to “the tendency to default to a state that consumes fewer cognitive 
resources” as the “cognitive miser” function.  Id. at 30.  
 111.   See id. at 28–30, 32. 
 112.   Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).  See also Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. 
L. REV. 1556 (2004) (examining the use of heuristics within the context of moral cognition).  
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circumstances.113 
System 1 can be further divided into two modes, 1) impressionistic 
thinking and 2) insightful intuition (including assimilation).114  “[T]here 
are two kinds of fast and simple ways of thinking: a stupid kind that 
represents the most primitive form of thinking and a smart kind that 
represents the highest form of thinking, insightful intuition.”115 
Impressionistic thinking is the mode prone to error because of a long list 
of biases and other cognitive errors, including representation bias.116  Long 
standing values and moral principles also influence impressionistic 
thinking and can create failed heuristics (rules of thumb that result in 
decisional errors).117  System 1 is also impacted by emotion, valence 
(encoded good or bad distinctions), and other kinds of unconscious but 
biased information.118 
In contrast, insightful intuition represents the integration of knowledge 
and experience to form more accurate and useful heuristics, which lead to 
fast and frugal decisions.119  Assimilation is the transfer of what was once 
System 2 metacognition into System 1 through experience and 
repetition—for example, with repetition and experience, resuscitation 
protocols become second nature for health care providers in the emergency 
                                                          
 113.   See Gerd Gigerenzer & Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Heuristic Decision Making, 62 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 451, 454–55 (2011). 
 114.   I am synthesizing here work from multiple disciplines in DPT.  See Valerie F. Reyna & 
Charles J. Brainerd, Dual Processes in Decision-Making and Developmental Neuroscience: A Fuzzy-
Trace Model, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 180, 186 (2011); Mark Kelman, Moral Realism and the 
Heuristics Debate, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 339 (2013) (providing an enlightening overview of the 
competing claims about heuristics); Croskerry, supra note 107, at 28, 32. 
 115.   Reyna & Brainerd, supra note 114, at 186. 
 116.   I have highlighted many of the more common types of error and bias previously in Dineen, 
supra note 27, at 32–46 (Section III).  See also Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, Behavioral 
Public Choice: A Survey, (Univ. of Freiburg, Dep’t of Econ. Policy & Constitutional Econ. Theory, 
Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik, Working Paper No. 14/03, 2014), 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/92975/1/777865785.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G83-JYEP] 
(“All these cognitive errors may be subsumed under one key bias, viz., ‘a disposition to lend undue 
weight to what is readily observed at the expense of appreciating what is below the surface.’” (quoting 
L. Lomasky, Swing and a Myth: A Review of Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter, 135 Pub. 
Choice 469, 471 (2008)).   
 117.   See, e.g., Jonathan C. Corbin et al., How Reasoning, Judgment, and Decision Making Are 
Colored by Gist-Based Intuition: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach, 4 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & 
COGNITION 344, 344–46 (2015).  
 118.   Reyna and Brainerd, supra note 114, at 185.  Theories of stigma refer to this unconscious 
information that attributes negative qualities to differences as “negative loading.”  See Norman 
Sartorius, Lessons from a 10-Year Global Programme Against Stigma and Discrimination Because of 
an Illness, 11 PSYCHOL. HEALTH & MED. 383, 383 (2006).  
 119.   See Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, supra note 113, at 454; Reyna & Brainerd, supra note 114, 
at 183 (“Implementation, or how people put together what they perceive about a situation (mental 
representation) with what they know and value (retrieved from long-term memory), accounts for 
additional variance in reasoning and decision making”). 
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department.120  Insightful intuition is less prone to error than 
impressionistic thinking, with errors stemming from “inadequate 
knowledge; incomplete gist representations; failure to retrieve relevant 
knowledge representations, and value . . .; and processing interference.”121 
On the other hand, System 2 is characterized by metacognition and is 
reflective and analytical.  Cass Sunstein described it this way: 
It is deliberative.  It calculates.  It hears a loud noise, and it assesses 
whether the noise is a cause for concern.  It thinks about probability, 
carefully though sometimes slowly.  If it sees reasons for offense, it 
makes a careful assessment of what, all things considered, ought to be 
done.  It insists on the importance of self-control.  It is a planner as well 
as a doer; it does what it has planned.122 
System 2 is far less prone to bias and error, but not immune.  Such 
errors typically reflect cognitive overload by the decision-maker (such as 
in the case of fatigue) or factual mistakes.123  Shifting thinking to System 
2 can be an effective way to detect and prevent decision-making errors or 
debias decision-making.124  Therefore, mechanisms that create a public 
choice architecture that primes policy makers to utilize System 2 thinking 
and consider alternative definitions of inappropriate prescribing may be 
helpful in improving policy evaluation and development. 
B. Errors by Policy Makers and Mitigation Strategies 
[T]he political rhetoric regarding the “opioid crisis” appears to call for 
immediate answers rather than careful research and measured 
responses. Policymakers in government and leaders in the nation’s 
medical community need to resist this urge to act too quickly on this topic 
once again.  Instead, all parties involved in these discussions must 
ensure that all patients are treated individually rather than painted with 
a broad brush.125 
Policy makers are prone to the same decisional errors as individuals, 
                                                          
 120.   See Croskerry, supra note 107, at 30–32. 
 121.   Susan J. Blalock & Valerie F. Reyna, Using Fuzzy Trace Theory to Understand and Improve 
Health Judgements, Decisions, and Behaviors: A Literature Review, 35 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 781, 789 
(2016). 
 122.   Cass R. Sunstein, Is Deontology a Heuristic? On Psychology, Neuroscience, Ethics, and 
Law (Harvard Univ. DASH Repository, preliminary draft, Sept. 1, 2013), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:13548959 [https://perma.cc/M9TP-44AL].  
 123.   See generally Dineen, supra note 27. 
 124.   Id.  
 125.   Benjamin Pomerance, Yet Another War: Battling for Reasoned Responses for Veterans 
Amid the Opioid Crisis, 11 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 147, 173 (2018). 
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and may be even more prone.126  One example is the tendency to devote 
risk mitigation resources to more salient but objectively less harmful 
issues.127  This is also known as the “availability bias,” “availability 
heuristic,” or the “focusing illusion,”  which “focuses the public’s 
attention on problems that receive significant media coverage, which 
causes the government to neglect more important but less newsworthy 
issues.”128  This is true even within a particular area, such as the opioid 
related crisis.  With the often myopic public focus on reducing opioid 
prescriptions alone, policy makers are likely neglecting a multitude of less 
salient harms.129 
According to Michael David Thomas, “policy that reflects 
policymakers’ own goals faces unreliable feedback from within the system 
and creates a situation of cognitive capture, whereby policy reflects the 
particular biases of a small group of experts.”130  Policy makers may also 
be particularly susceptible to reputational cascades and in-group biases.131 
Availability cascades—the concurrent effects of availability bias, 
reputational bias, and bandwagon effect—likely also play a significant 
role in prescription opioid policy.132  This cascade begins when policy-
makers focus on the most salient information and neglect other important 
root causes and sources of harm.133  As this salient but incomplete 
information is repeated to other experts and policy-makers, it is often taken 
as valid without checking underlying facts (i.e. reputation bias).134  Finally, 
the desire to preserve in-group norms and personal and professional 
reputations leads to widespread adoption of incomplete information, 
leading to over-reaction and incoherent regulation—often with serious 
                                                          
 126.   See, e.g., Lucas & Tasic, supra note 97. 
 127.   See, e.g., Schnellenbach & Schubert, supra note 116, at 29.  
 128.   Lucas & Tasic, supra note 97, at 211 (further explaining on pages 217–18 that “as a result 
of focusing illusion, voters and politicians do not evaluate policies globally by considering all angles, 
including interrelationships among policies. Instead, their analyses are subject to pervasive framing, 
salience, and vividness effects”).   
 129.   These include the known dangers of concurrent use of other drugs and substances, the levels 
of suicidality, and the need to get patients with SUDs into treatment.  See generally Dineen, supra 
note 27, at 1–29.   
 130.   Michael David Thomas, Reapplying Behavioral Symmetry: Public Choice and Choice 
Architecture, PUB. CHOICE, July 2018, at 1, 16.  
 131.   See generally Jörg Gross, Carsten K. W. De Dreu, The Rise and Fall of Cooperation Through 
Reputation and Group Polarization, 10 NATURE COMM., no. 776, Feb. 2019, 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-08727-8 [https://perma.cc/KQ6V-YALA]; Lucas & Tasic, supra 
note 97.  
 132.   See Dineen, supra note 27, at 32–46 (Section III).  
 133.   Id. 
 134.   Id. 
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unintended consequences.135  In the end, policy-makers too “frequently 
fail to see past the superficial effects of government policy, which is why 
so many policies are undermined by unintended consequences.”136 
A variety of techniques to mitigate decisional errors by decreasing bias 
have been studied.137  Debiasing is generally understood “as a strategy (or 
set of strategies) designed to suppress/mitigate biases, or at least to 
suppress/mitigate their effects.”138  Providing a taxonomy of inappropriate 
prescribing may inform the choices of public policy actors by serving as a 
contextual debiasing mechanism139 and a restructuring approach—by 
deconstructing the meanings of “misprescribing” and creating a “consider- 
the-alternatives” mechanism.140 
C. The failed “misprescribing” heuristic and limited definitions 
In practice, overprescribing is an amalgamation of prescribing 
behaviors encompassing starting dose, number of units in a prescription, 
dosing schedules, potency, and other factors.  A rational approach would 
treat these as parallel but distinct issues.  Yet, the legislative and clinical 
reaction has included efforts to bring dosage below arbitrary targets or 
abandon patients who do not conform to clinically arbitrary 
expectations.141 
Heuristics are shortcuts or rules of thumb,142 but when they cause 
“mental contamination,”143 they are appropriately described as failed 
                                                          
 135.   Id.  For a comprehensive explanation of availability cascades, see Timur Kuran & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999).  
 136.   Lucas & Tasic, supra note 97, at 218.  
 137.   For an excellent overview, See Frank Zenker et al., Reliable Debiasing Techniques in Legal 
Contexts? Weak Signals from a Darker Corner of the Social Science Universe, in THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF ARGUMENT 173 (Fabio Paglieri et al. eds., 2015). 
 138.   Vasco Correia, Contextual Debiasing and Critical Thinking: Reasons for Optimism, 37 
TOPOI 103, 105 (2018). 
 139.   See, e.g., Mark L. Graber et al., Cognitive Interventions to Reduce Diagnostic Errors: A 
Narrative Review, 21 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 535, 535 (2011) (conducting a retrospective review 
of the literature and categorizing debiasing strategies).  
 140.   See Zenker et al., supra note 137 (reviewing interdisciplinary literature on bias and error 
and discussing the effectiveness of debiasing techniques, of which considering the alternatives and 
deconstructing the issue are among the most promising). 
 141.   Dasgupta et al., supra note 47.  
 142.   Shabnam Mousavi & Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuristics are Tools for Uncertainty, 34 HOMO 
OECON 361, 367 (2017).  For an excellent discussion of the evolution of the meaning of heuristic, see 
Croskerry, supra note 45, at 114–15.  
 143.   Pat Croskerry et al., Cognitive Debiasing 1: Origins of Bias and Theory of Debiasing, 22 
BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY ii58, ii62 (2013) (quoting TD Wilson & N. Brekke, Mental Contamination 
and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
117 (1994)).  
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heuristics.144  Heuristics allow decision-makers to use fewer pieces of 
information, reduce the retrieval of information, simplify the weighting of 
information, and examine fewer alternatives.145  They must be carefully 
tailored in terms of content and context to result in effective decision-
making, what is sometimes referred to as “ecological rationality.”146 
Absent ecological rationality, heuristics will fail.  One category of 
heuristics based on recognition can be effective but “incurs bias by 
searching for only a specific pattern or cue stored in memory and does not 
aim to assess values of other objects.”147  What I describe below as a 
misprescribing heuristic may fail, in part, because of this recognition bias.  
The current state of wide ranging and incomplete definitions may lead 
policymakers to search and recognize only one or a few patterns that are 
overrepresented, without consideration of important other categories of 
recognition.  Failed heuristics can combine and create cascades (such as 
availability cascades), which exacerbate suboptimal and incoherent 
decisions.148  Failed heuristics are also steeped in deeply held values and 
emotions (generally negative and likely to contribute to visceral biases).149  
According to Schnellenbach and Schubert, 
Instead of carefully evaluating all possible alternatives, [policy-makers] 
will typically use heuristics and follow rules of thumb.  While in general, 
the use of heuristics appears to be a quite efficient strategy . . . , matters 
may again be different in politics, where rules of thumb tend to be related 
to stable ideologies, which may not offer very precise guidance to 
solving policy problems.150 
What I describe as the “misprescribing heuristic” is a failed heuristic. 
                                                          
 144.   There is significant disagreement about the use of the term.  I choose to use the term “failed 
heuristic” to acknowledge that not all heuristics result in bad decisions.  Under theories of bounded 
rationality, heuristics describe biases; however, I am synthesizing the medical literature, the fuzzy 
trace theory (also a dual process theory), and work on bounded rationality and want to honor the fact 
that heuristics that develop through experience and skill may be helpful to decision-makers.  
 145.   Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, supra note 113, at 454 (citing AK Shah & DM Oppenheimer, 
Heuristics Made Easy: An Effort-Reduction Framework, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 207 (2008)).  
 146.   Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra note 142, at 367 (“The ecological rationality of a decision 
rule is assessed based on norms that are sensitive to the content of the problem and the context of the 
situation.”).  
 147.   Florian Artinger, Malte Petersen, Gerd Gigerenzer & Jürgen Weibler, Heuristics as Adaptive 
Decision Strategies in Management, 36 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. S33, S42 (2015). 
 148.   See Dineen, supra note 27 (applying availability cascades to opioid related crises responses).  
 149.   Id. at 44–45. 
 150.   Schnellenbach & Schubert, supra note 116, at 25 (citing Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, supra 
note 113).  
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1. The misprescribing heuristic 
A misprescribing heuristic impacts policy decisions.  A variety of 
words and phrases—“overprescribing,” “misprescribing,” “inappropriate 
prescribing”—are now heuristics (collectively, “misprescribing 
heuristic”) for a range of prescribing behaviors from careful (e.g., a careful 
prescriber being fooled by a person feigning pain to divert drugs to the 
market) to criminal (a provider knowingly abandoning their provider role 
for self-gain).151  The misprescribing heuristic includes behaviors between 
careful and criminal prescribing, such as prescribing long term opioids 
when risks to the patient outweigh the benefits.152  It also includes 
prescribing far more pills than a patient will need therapeutically—
especially after procedures or for acute pain from injuries—leaving extra 
pills available for diversion,153 the primary source of non-medically used 
opioids.154  What the misprescribing heuristic does not include is what I 
will refer to as “underprescribing,” including failure to refer patients for 
appropriate pharmacological therapy (usually referred to as “medication 
assisted treatment”)155 in whom an SUD is suspected nor does it include 
too rapid tapering or cold turkey discontinuation of opioids in “legacy 
patients.”156 
The heterogeneity of prescribing types captured by the misprescribing 
heuristic, as well as the neglect of some types of inappropriate prescribing, 
make it ineffective. 
                                                          
 151.   See generally Dineen, supra note 84; Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67.  
 152.   See generally Jane C. Ballantyne, Opioids for the Treatment of Chronic Pain: Mistakes 
Made, Lessons Learned, and Future Directions, 125 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 1769 (2017). 
 153.   See, e.g., Cornelius A. Thiels et al., Wide Variation and Overprescription of Opioids After 
Elective Surgery, 266 ANNALS SURGERY 564, 564 (2017); Makary et al., supra note 30 (using 
overprescribing to describe surgeon behavior in discharging patients with too many pills).  
 154.   See Lapari & Hughes, supra note 98.  
 155.   Medication assisted treatment is the tradition terminology and what appears in the federal 
and state regulations and much of the literature.  Nonetheless, I choose to not use that terminology 
because it adds to the stigma of SUD and furthers the cognitive separation of treatment of addiction 
from treatment of all other health problems.  See Sarah E. Wakeman, Medications for Addiction 
Treatment: Changing Language to Improve Care, 11 J. ADDICTION MED. 1, 1–2 (2017). 
 156.   Legacy patients are those patients who have long been treated with opioids for chronic pain, 
many of whom report functioning best on stable doses.  See Travis Rieder, There’s Never Just One 
Side to the Story: Why America Must Stop Swinging the Opioid Pendulum, 8 NARRATIVE INQUIRY 
BIOETHICS 225, 228 (2018). Interestingly, at a conference on February 22, 2019, at American 
University, Thomas Farley, the health commissioner of Philadelphia, explained that the city recently 
looked for tapering guidelines and found absolutely zero.  They subsequently developed a set of 
guidelines. For information about the conference, see AUWCL’s Health Law and Policy Program 
Hosts Opioid Crisis Conference, WCL.AMERICAN.EDU (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.wcl.american.edu/impact/initiatives-programs/health/events/opioidconference/videos/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q5BP-4JKT]. 
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2. Implicit and missing definitions of inappropriate prescribing in law 
and policy 
Explicit definitions of inappropriate prescribing are rare.  One 
definition comes from the medical literature in a non-opioid specific 
context.  According to Selic and colleagues: 
Inappropriate prescribing means the use of a drug for which the risk of 
[adverse drug events] outweighs the clinical benefits, and which could 
result in harmful effects, either through interactions between drugs or 
through the non-use of a drug with proven efficiency for patients with 
sufficiently long life expectancy and a good quality of life.157 
This definition is excellent because it includes the continued use of 
drugs when the risks outweigh the benefits, the risks of drug interactions, 
as well as the failure to use a drug that is appropriate for a particular 
patient.  Each of these are incorporated in the taxonomy of misprescribing 
below. 
In the legal and public policy contexts, no such definitions were 
discovered.  Implicit definitions do exist.  In the criminal context, the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) makes exceptions from criminal 
distribution prohibitions for prescriptions that are for a “legitimate medical 
purpose” in the “usual course of . . . professional practice.”158  Prescribers 
who knowingly (including constructive knowledge and willful blindness) 
deviate from this exception violate the CSA.159 
The Drug Enforcement Agency’s Practitioner Manual further lists 
criteria indicative of what they call “inappropriate prescribing,” a heuristic 
device to mean criminal prescribing.  According to the manual: 
While there are no criteria to address every conceivable instance of 
prescribing, there are recurring patterns that may be indicative of 
inappropriate prescribing: [a]n inordinately large quantity of controlled 
substances prescribed or large numbers of prescriptions issued compared 
to other physicians in an area; [n]o physical examination was given; 
[w]arnings to the patient to fill prescriptions at different drug stores; 
[i]ssuing prescriptions knowing that the patient was delivering the drugs 
                                                          
 157.   Polona Selic et al., The Effects of a Web Application and Medical Monitoring on the Quality 
of Medication, Adverse Drug Events and Adherence in the Elderly Living at Home: a Protocol of the 
Study, 28 MATERIA SOCIO-MEDICA 432, 432 (2016) (defining inappropriate prescribing in the context 
of multiple medication use in the elderly rather than in the context of opioid use).  
 158.   21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2018).  See also Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67, at 29–48 
(reviewing the current standard for criminal violations for misprescribing and recommending a 
category of corrupt prescribing).  
 159.   Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67, at 30–31.  
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to others; [i]ssuing prescriptions in exchange for sexual favors or for 
money; [p]rescribing of controlled drugs at intervals inconsistent with 
legitimate medical treatment; [t]he use of street slang rather than medical 
terminology for the drugs prescribed; or [n]o logical relationship 
between the drugs prescribed and treatment of the condition allegedly 
existing.160 
This implicit definition addresses corrupt prescribing only.  However, 
the patterns they list do not necessarily correlate with corrupt or criminal 
prescribing.  In particular, “inordinate” amounts depend upon context and 
prescriber specialty.  On the other hand, some are squarely within the 
criminal standard, such as exchanging prescriptions for sexual favors or 
money. 
Other federal agencies also only implicitly define inappropriate 
prescribing.  The FDA, a consumer protection agency, focuses more on 
careless prescribing.161  For example, the FDA commissioner uses the term 
frequently, but without definition.162  The FDA’s Opioid Analgesic REMS 
Education Blueprint for Health Care Providers Involved in the Treatment 
and Monitoring of Patients with Pain does not define inappropriate 
prescribing at all.163  The Center for Medicaid and CHIP Services 
addresses inappropriate prescribing in terms of misuse by the 
patient/recipient, tracking recipients that receive opioids “(1) at high 
dosage, (2) from multiple prescribers and pharmacies, and (3) at high 
dosage and from multiple prescribers and pharmacies.”164  One problem 
with this approach is that unless this occurs in a state with a mandatory 
PDMP with real time reporting, it may not reflect inappropriate 
prescribing at all.  Prescribers are not lie detectors, and other research 
                                                          
 160.   OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL 30 
(2006), https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pract/pract_manual012508.pdf#search= 
inappropriate%20prescribing [https://perma.cc/S5SH-N8TB] (emphasis added).  
 161.   See Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67, at 28–29 (reviewing the regulation of prescribing by 
the FDA). 
 162.   See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner 
Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on Agency’s Approval of Dsuvia and the FDA’s Future Consideration of New 
Opioids (Nov. 2, 2018),  https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ 
ucm624968.htm [https://perma.cc/BMW8-XH2B]. See also Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin., Remarks at the NCCN/ASCO Workshop (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm625333.htm [https://perma.cc/M67A-P225] (implicitly linking 
inappropriate prescribing to dose and duration of opioids).  
 163.   See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA’S OPIOID 
ANALGESIC REMS EDUCATION BLUEPRINT FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS INVOLVED IN THE 
TREATMENT AND MONITORING OF PATIENTS WITH PAIN (2018).   
 164.   CTR. FOR MEDICAID AND CHIP SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BEST 
PRACTICES FOR ADDRESSING PRESCRIPTION OPIOID OVERDOSES, MISUSE AND ADDICTION 7 (2016), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/cib-02-02-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
QE88-VLTQ].  
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supports that their chances of detecting dishonesty are only slightly better 
than chance.165  These criteria may indicate a condition for which high 
doses are appropriate, an OUD, or criminal diversion.  As such, it lacks 
the context needed to accurately evaluate prescribing practices. 
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services recently expanded its 
tracking of opioid use by Medicare recipients without cancer.  They will 
measure three criteria: 1) adults who receive equal to or greater than 90 
MME for 90 or more days; 2) adults who receive four prescriptions in any 
MME and from four or more pharmacies in 180 days or less; and 3) the 
percentage of all adults who received 90 MME or higher daily dose and 
from four or more prescribers and four or more pharmacies within 180 
days.166  These measures, like many others, track only some areas of 
concern and focus disproportionately on chronic pain treatment.  These 
measures may also identify patients who may have an OUD.  However, 
there is an alarming paucity of guidance for practitioners in how to assist 
these patients.167 Providers may simply discharge these patients instead of 
referring them to OUD treatment,168 and there are systematic barriers to 
access appropriate treatment for opioid use and other SUDs.169  These 
tracking criteria also do nothing to address reflexive prescribing after 
surgeries or procedures; yet, reducing reflexive prescribing is one of the 
few interventions estimated to reduce overall opioid related poisoning 
deaths in 5 and 10 years.170 
                                                          
 165.   See Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67, at 18–20.  
 166.   CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CMS-
2018-0154, ADVANCE NOTICE OF METHODOLOGICAL CHANGES FOR CALENDAR YEAR (CY) 2020 FOR 
MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (MA) CAPITATION RATES, PART C AND PART D PAYMENT POLICIES AND 
2020 DRAFT CALL LETTER 136 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-
Plans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Advance2020Part2.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHQ6-
MBDE] (describing their efforts as better aligning with the CDC Guidelines). 
 167.   For an excellent discussion of the significant barriers to adequate treatment for patients who 
are on opioids, see William C. Becker et al., Management of Patients with Issues Related to Opioid 
Safety, Efficacy and/or Misuse: A Case Series from an Integrated, Interdisciplinary Clinic, ADDICTION 
SCI. & CLINICAL PRAC., Jan. 28, 2016, at 1, 1, https://doi.org/10.1186/s13722-016-0050-0 
[https://perma.cc/2GVA-S5L4].  
 168.   See, e.g., Shannon M. Nugent et al., Substance Use Disorder Treatment Following 
Clinician-Initiated Discontinuation of Long-Term Opioid Therapy Resulting from an Aberrant Urine 
Drug Test, 32 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1076, 1079 (2017) (finding only 43% of the time did providers 
refer patients with suspected OUD for treatment); Zoe Clancy et al., The Use of Urine Drug 
Monitoring in Chronic Opioid Therapy: An Analysis of Current Clinician Behavior, 9 J. OPIOID 
MGMT. 121 (2013) (finding more physicians would discharge a patient with a suspicious urine drug 
screening than even have a discussion with them about substance use disorder).  
 169.   For an excellent discussion of systemic barriers to SUD treatment, see Robert D. Ashford et 
al., Systemic Barriers in Substance Use Disorder Treatment: A Prospective Qualitative Study of 
Professionals in the Field, 189 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 62 (2018).  
 170.   See Pitt et al., supra note 93, at 1396–97. 
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Recent federal laws similarly lack definitions.  The SUPPORT Act 
authorized new evidence-based prevention grants, which includes projects 
that use PDMPs to detect inappropriate prescribing; however, 
inappropriate prescribing is not defined.171  Section 6902 of the SUPPORT 
Act is aimed at inpatient hospital care and directs the U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services to develop guidance to hospitals on, among 
other things, identifying overprescribing.172  Again, no definitions are 
provided.  The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, 
mentions inappropriate prescribing only once, requiring the Veteran’s 
Administration to report on how it tracks inappropriate prescribing, yet no 
definitions or criteria are offered.173 
Nevada is one of the only states to recognize a need for defining 
inappropriate prescribing but did so after it passed sweeping legislation 
significantly limiting opioid prescribing.174  The Nevada Senate 
Committee on Health and Human Services noted “[w]hile inappropriate 
prescribing comes in many forms, generally, it is prescribing outside of 
the standard of care for a prescriber’s practice, specialty or otherwise 
outside the medical need of the patient. . . . [W]e are placing the 
responsibility of identifying inappropriate prescribing on the State’s 
licensing boards.”175  As of this writing, “inappropriate prescribing” 
remains undefined. 
A Florida regulation requires continuing education on inappropriate 
                                                          
 171.   42 U.S.C. § 280b–1 (Supp. V 2018).  
 172.   SUPPORT Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 6092(c)(5), 132 Stat. 3894, 4001 (2018).  
 173.   Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA), Pub. L. 114-198, 130 Stat. 
695.  Section 913 requires the comptroller general of the United States to report on the VA’s efforts 
to identify “inappropriate prescribing” in (a)(2)(A) and evaluate the VA’s process for identifying 
overprescribing in (a)(2)(C).  Id. § 913(a)(2)(A), 130 Stat. at 762.  There are also surveillance 
requirements in Section 913(c) that implicitly aim to track inappropriate prescribing but again, they 
focus on receiving prescriptions from more than one provider, concurrent prescription of opioids and 
benzodiazepines, and the concurrent filling of ongoing opioid prescriptions while the patient was 
hospitalized as an inpatient.  Id. § 913(c), 130 Stat. at 764. 
 174.   Nevada passed a state law limiting opioid prescribing significantly without defining 
inappropriate prescribing.  See, e.g., Megan Messerly, Opioids in Nevada: How One New Law 
Attempts to Address the Epidemic and Why Some Doctors Are Pushing Back, NEV. INDEP. (Jan. 14, 
2018, 2:10 AM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/opioids-in-nevada-how-one-new-law-
attempts-to-address-the-epidemic-and-why-some-doctors-are-pushing-back.  The Nevada Senate 
Committee on Health and Human Services discussed the need to have inappropriate prescribing 
defined and offered a very general definition in committee.  See S. Comm. Health & Human Servs., 
MINUTES, 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/79th2017/Minutes/Senate/ 
HHS/Final/1185.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT8Y-YAGB].  
 175.   S. COMM. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MINUTES, 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017), 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/79th2017/Minutes/Senate/HHS/Final/1185.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/3MYB-3W23].   
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prescribing but provides no information on what that means.176  
Washington’s prescribing regulations were recently changed and address 
inappropriate prescribing, but again, without definition.177  Maine adopted 
the idea that clinical practice guidelines, including the CDC Guideline, 
provide the needed definition of inappropriate prescribing.178  A Michigan 
appropriations bill requires reporting on administration actions against 
providers for overprescribing, but again provides no guidance or 
definition.179  Texas regulations use the term “non-therapeutic 
prescribing” and implicitly define it as prescribing that might “lead to or 
contribute to abuse, addiction, and/or diversion of drugs.”180 
The inconsistency across agencies and jurisdictions, as well as the 
outright lack of definitions is problematic—it may fuel overcorrection and 
fear by providers and other stakeholders.  It leaves policy makers, 
including, but not limited to, institutions, professional board members, and 
enforcement authorities, without the context needed to evaluate 
prescribing practices.  These inconsistencies may even be deadly; for 
example, the neglect of significant sources of prescribing related harm, 
such as outright discontinuation or too rapid tapering, may fuel upticks in 
illicit opioid use as well as suicides. 
IV. A TAXONOMY OF INAPPROPRIATE PRESCRIBING 
The availability of information alone does not ensure that it will be—or 
can be—incorporated.  Information that . . . lacks a framework that 
decision makers can readily understand is unlikely to feed into their 
thinking.181 
Previous work has divided prescribers into four types—careful, 
                                                          
 176.   Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r.64B15–13.001 (2019).  
 177.   Wash. St. Reg. 18-23-061 (Jan. 1, 2019) (amending various portions Wash. Admin. Code 
§§ 246-918 and 919 regarding opioid prescribing by physicians, physician assistants, and advance 
practice nurses).   
 178.   02-380-021 Me. Code R. § 1, 5 (LexisNexis 2019).  
 179.   Michigan Senate Bill 800 (2015), Article XIII § 517 (enacted) (“the department shall submit 
a report to the subcommittees that includes all of the following: (a) Number of administrative actions 
taken against prescriber licenses related to opioid prescribing, including the location of where the 
prescriber practiced and any specialty certifications that prescriber has held since 2010. (b)  The 
number of prescribers who were identified as overprescribing. (c)  The actions taken to notify those 
prescribers who were overprescribing”).  
 180.   22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §170.1 (2019).  To their credit, at least abuse, addiction, and 
diversion are defined in § 170.2.  Id. § 170.2. Texas lawmakers also clarified that inappropriate 
prescribing under regulations for pain clinics includes non-therapeutic prescribing. S.B. 315, sec. 5, 
85th Legis., 2017–2018 Sess. (2017).  
 181.   Elisabeth A. Graffy, Meeting the Challenges of Policy-Relevant Science: Bridging Theory 
and Practice, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 1087, 1094 (2008).  
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careless, corrupt, and compromised by impairment.182  This classification 
is consistent with an empirical analysis of 100 cases of misprescribing.183  
Careless prescribers may engage in qualitative overprescribing, 
quantitative overprescribing, or multi-class misprescribing (described 
below).  This is less common in cases of misprescribing by providers who 
are compromised by their own impairments—such as an SUD—as they 
tend to obtain prescription drugs for their own use rather than harming 
patients.184  Corrupt prescribers, on the other hand, are those who have 
abandoned their practice so completely that they can no longer be 
described as within the bounds of professional practice, either by 
knowingly trading prescribing privileges for personal gain or through 
carelessness that has crossed the threshold into corrupt prescribing through 
the exercise of willful blindness.185 
Particularly within the category of careless prescribers, more 
contextual information is required.186  Focusing on character of the 
prescribing behavior itself, rather than simply describing the prescriber 
types, is necessary to further guide evaluation of prescribing practices.  
This is particularly true in the highly complex and value-laden areas 
around prescribing drugs that are controlled substances.  The highly 
charged area of opioid prescribing requires careful categorization to guide 
all stakeholders in the position of evaluating the appropriateness of these 
prescriptions.  Opioid prescriptions must be evaluated in context.  As 
explained by Travis Rieder: 
[I]t may become obvious that no number of pills or of morphine 
equivalents—and that includes the number zero—should be the aim as 
we seek to change practice.  It is not the case that the risk of 
overprescribing means we should aim to eliminate opioids.  What I 
propose, rather, is prescribing an appropriate amount of opioids, 
                                                          
 182.   See generally Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67 (reviewing and rejecting the long-standing 
classification of misprescribers—Dated, Duped, Disabled, & Dishonest—in light of evidence and 
suggesting a new framework of careless, corrupt, and compromised by impairment).  
 183.   See DuBois et al., supra note 50 (reviewing 100 cases of misprescribing and describing the 
facts statistically associated with misprescribing related sanctions—including being male, having little 
oversight—such as a solo practice, having an underlying personality disorder—and describing the 
types of misprescribing as fitting within the careless, corrupt, and compromised by impairment 
categories).  
 184.   See id. at 16–19; Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67, at 49. 
 185.   Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67, at 40–50 (providing multiple example cases and a full 
discussion of what constitutes each category). 
 186.   For example, PDMP data is often analyzed by number of prescriptions only.  Only recently 
have some researchers examined the important of tracking the number of pills, the total morphine 
equivalents, and the specialty of prescribers.  See Scott G Weiner et al., Opioid Prescriptions by 
Specialty in Ohio, 2010–2014, 19 PAIN MED. 978, 978 (2018).  
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whatever that turns out to be.187 
The taxonomy of misprescribing includes corrupt prescribing, 
inadvertent overprescribing, qualitative overprescribing, quantitative 
overprescribing, multi-class misprescribing, and underprescribing.  Each 
category is described below. 
A. Corrupt Prescribing 
Prescribers who abandon their provider role in favor of personal profit 
comprise this category.188  Although this represents a very small portion 
of providers and a smaller portion yet of misprescribing, it is salient 
because it is an affront to the trust placed in health care providers and the 
privileged role they occupy.189 
The boundaries of corrupt prescribing should be clear to policymakers 
and providers: it applies when providers abandon their professional 
obligations and engage in prescribing that poses palpable harm to others 
for personal gain.  Corrupt prescribing is not about poor practice, 
malpractice, or carelessness.  Federal courts have consistently held that a 
deviation from the standard of care is not sufficient to meet the mens rea 
requirement of knowledge under the controlled substance act.  Instead, 
pursuant to Feingold, providers must depart from being even a “bad 
doctor” to “a ‘pusher’ whose conduct is without a legitimate medical 
justification.”190  Nonetheless, providers continue to fear criminal 
investigation and sanction; moreover, prosecutorial overreach is in no 
short supply in the current climate.191 
Ample regulatory tools already exist for sanctioning corrupt 
prescribing, from federal and state criminal laws to professional board 
                                                          
 187.   Travis N. Reider, Opioids and Ethics: Is Opioid-Free the Only Responsible Arthroplasty?, 
15 HSS J. 12, 12 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11420-018-9651-3 [https://perma.cc/4N2Y-HGTU]. 
 188.   For a detailed examination of corrupt prescribing, see Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67, at 
42–48.  See also DuBois et al., supra note 50, at 16–19.  
 189.   These cases tend to have damning facts that clearly indicate a departure from medical 
standards.  See, e.g., Tom Winter et al., Feds Charge 5 New York Doctors with Prescribing 8.5 Million 
Opioid Pills, NBC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2018, 10:57 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-
courts/feds-charge-5-new-york-doctors-prescribing-8-5-million-n918966 [https://perma.cc/4YT2-
HJD6](describing doctors meeting patients in the middle of the night, prescribing for cash only, and 
without appointments).  
 190.   United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 191.   See, e.g., Bill Rankin, Prosecutors Notify 30 Doctors About Excessive Opioid Prescribing, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/crime—law/prosecutors-notify-
doctors-about-excessive-opioid-prescriptions/fXSbsKBg8XiMc9y7wj3wPN/ https://perma.cc/U444-
C8KY] (describing prosecutors sending letters to doctors they judge to be outliers in prescribing 
without any evidence of criminal behavior).  
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scrutiny to tort remedies.192  Other policies, such as Pill Mill Laws, were 
designed to eliminate such corrupt prescribing.193  Once corrupt providers 
are sanctioned at the criminal level, administrative and civil remedies are 
likely to follow. 
B. Inadvertent Overprescribing 
Careful prescribers will generally write appropriate prescriptions, with 
the exception of what I call “inadvertent overprescribing.”  Inadvertent 
overprescribing occurs in a very narrow set of circumstances.  It occurs 
when, despite the exercise of care by the prescriber, an individual feigning 
pain obtains prescriptions for opioids or other controlled substances.  
Providers are not lie detectors, nor does experience improve their odds of 
lie detection.194  This “provider as lie detector” mythology must be put to 
rest.195  This category acknowledges that there are times when careful 
prescribers will inadvertently overprescribe.  Sanctions are inappropriate 
if due care is exercised. 
Interventions such as PDMPs or urine drug monitoring may be useful 
in preventing inadvertent overprescribing.196  For example, in 
circumstances where PDMPs are accurate and up-to-date, a careful 
prescriber may identify a problematic pattern of prescriptions for a 
particular patient before prescribing.  Urine drug monitoring may indicate 
an underlying SUD by identifying non-prescribed substances.197  It may 
also indicate a patient who is diverting prescription opioids for money 
rather than taking them.198 
What happens next is critical and unfortunately poorly addressed in 
                                                          
 192.   See, e.g., Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67, at 21–40. See also Y. Tony Yang & Rebecca L. 
Haffajee, Murder Liability for Prescribing Opioids: A Way Forward?, 91 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1331, 
1331–34 (2016).   
 193.   See, e.g., Andraka-Christou et al., supra note 62, at 8–9. 
 194.   See Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67, 18–20. 
 195.   For an example of the way this mythology appears in policy, see Don’t Be Scammed by a 
Drug Abuser, DIVERSION CTRL. DIV. (Dec. 1999), https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/ 
brochures/pdfs/recognizing_drug_abuser_trifold.pdf [https://perma.cc/NH85-XJ97].  
 196.   It may be useful if the PDMP is accurate, up to date, and the patient is using their own name 
or a consistent name at encounters; however, serious concerns exist about whether PDMPs are being 
used as a health care tool or as a law enforcement mechanism.  See, e.g., Jennifer D. Oliva, Prescription 
Drug Policing: The Right to Protected Health Information Privacy Pre- and Post- Carpenter, 69 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (“PDMPs are largely criminal and regulatory law enforcement tools 
dressed up in public health promoting rhetoric”).  
 197.   See, e.g., Anand C. Thakur, Pain Management Assessment Beyond the Physician Encounter: 
Urine Drug Monitoring and Patient Agreements, in PRESCRIPTION DRUG DIVERSION AND PAIN, supra 
note 40, at 219.  
 198.   See id. at 219, 231. 
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practice, particularly when a SUD is suspected.199  In a study by 
Hagemeier and colleagues, a group of physicians discussed this reality: 
 
MD1: Usually they’ll fail the drug screen or the prescriber database and 
that takes care of it.  We discharge from the practice.  Now the one thing 
I don’t think we do is say ‘Hey here are some treatment centers,’ do we? 
MD2: No we don’t 
MD1: We probably ought to say here’s some options . . . 
MD2: Here’s some options for treatment.  We just . . . I don’t know. 
MD3: But you’re too ticked off at them.200 
 
Similarly, a study by Clancy and colleagues found that doctors were 
more likely to discharge a patient than discuss the urine drug test results 
with a patient after a positive urine screening result for a non-marijuana, 
illicit drug.201 
Although some recent research exists on the need to deal with 
concerns about SUDs or diversion holistically, recommendations for 
communication and referral to treatment are not often followed in practice.  
Authors in one study acknowledged that their holistic recommendations 
are “in contrast to contemporary clinical practice, in which providers may 
feel compelled to make major decisions abruptly (e.g., taper or discontinue 
opioids) due to state or local policies or licensure concerns, regardless of 
whether these decisions are warranted.”202  In contrast, a recent news story 
on a town’s successful, comprehensive harm reduction approach to the 
opioid crisis demonstrates the appropriate provider approach.  According 
to Dr. Bell: 
If you find a person’s urine has a bunch of meth and not their pain meds, 
you make the assumption they are selling their pain meds to get meth 
. . . . But we don’t kick them out of our clinic.  We say, ‘OK, what is 
going on?  Do you need help?’  Then we get them into treatment.203 
                                                          
 199.   There is wide variation in how providers deal with concerning PDMP information, with 
some having discussions and providing referrals and some discharging (or “firing”) patients with 
questionable PDMP findings. See, e.g., Gillian J. Leichtling et al., Clinicians’ Use of Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Programs in Clinical Practice and Decision-Making, 18 PAIN MED. 1063, 1063 
(2017).  
 200.   Nicholas E. Hagemeier et al., Prescription Drug Abuse Communication: A Qualitative 
Analysis of Prescriber and Pharmacist Perceptions and Behaviors, 12 RES. SOC. & ADMIN. 
PHARMACY 937, 944 (emphasis added).  
 201.   Zoe Clancy et al., The Use of Urine Drug Monitoring in Chronic Opioid Therapy: An 
Analysis of Current Clinician Behavior, 9 J. OPIOID MGMT. 121, 125–26 (2013). 
 202.   Jessica S. Merlin et al., Managing Concerning Behaviors in Patients Prescribed Opioids for 
Chronic Pain: A Delphi Study, J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 166, 166–76 (2018).  
 203.   Dan Vergano, Here’s How One Small Town Beat the Opioid Epidemic, BUZZFEED NEWS 
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However difficult to effectuate, prescribers do have an ethical and 
professional obligation to assess the patient for OUD and offer treatment 
or referral to treatment.  This reality is acknowledged in some policy 
documents.204  The fact that providers often fail to refer to treatment is 
likely connected to the recently reported failures of PDMPs to reduce 
overall opioid related harms, including patients with SUDs shifting to 
illicit and more dangerous drugs.205  Prescribers should not be placed in a 
quasi law enforcement position—a position inapposite to their fiduciary 
duties to patients and inapposite to the trust needed for effective provider-
patient communication.206 
Sometimes overprescribing is inadvertent and can happen to the most 
careful providers.  Available tools may not detect concerning patterns.207  
Providers are not lie detectors.  These realities are often obscured by the 
over-confidence by providers in their own abilities, self-serving biases, 
and the pervasiveness of the lie detection mythology in law and medicine. 
                                                          
(Feb. 25, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/danvergano/overdose-prevention-
little-falls-minnesota [https://perma.cc/GHG6-UYMW].  
 204.   The CDC Guideline states that providers should not discharge a patient after a concerning 
PDMP finding.  Dowell et al., supra note 4, at 30 (“Experts agreed that clinicians should not dismiss 
patients from their practice on the basis of PDMP information. Doing so can adversely affect patient 
safety, could represent patient abandonment, and could result in missed opportunities to provide 
potentially lifesaving information (e.g., about risks of opioids and overdose prevention) and 
interventions (e.g., safer prescriptions, nonopioid pain treatment . . . , naloxone . . . , and effective 
treatment for substance use disorder . . . .”).  See also Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. 
Admin., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: A Guide for 
Healthcare Providers, IN BRIEF, Winter 2017, at 1, 8 https://store.samhsa.gov/system/files/sma16-
4997.pdf [https://perma.cc/92FQ-KR88] (recommending that providers assess and refer to treatment 
rather than discharging them); NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS, COMPONENTS OF A 
STRONG PRESCRIPTION MONITORING PROGRAM 3 (2015) https://namsdl.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
Components-of-a-Strong-Prescription-Monitoring-Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2VQ-EWL8] 
(PDMP data “should initially be provided to a patient’s prescriber(s) and/or dispenser(s) with the goal 
of referring such patient to treatment, if such prescriber or dispenser deems it necessary, rather than 
referring the PMP information to law enforcement in the absence of clear evidence of illegal 
activity.”).   
 205.   See, e.g., Pitt et al., supra note 93, at 1396–97; Hadland & Beletsky, supra note 91, at 1–2.  
 206.   See, e.g., FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS 
(PDMPS) (2018), http://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/policies/prescription-drug-monitoring-
programs—-adopted.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R74-G6BQ] (unfortunately, this policy document does 
not recommend or even acknowledge the issue of referral to treatment as the preferred option).  See 
generally Dineen & DuBois, supra note 67 (discussing the conflict between the ends of medicine and 
the ends of law enforcement).  
 207.   An example stands out from my time in nursing. One of our patients received fentanyl 
patches for high impact chronic pain.  He never missed an appointment and his urine drug screening 
tests were always consistent with the medications prescribed.  After treating him for more than a year, 
I received a call from his spouse who told me the patient had a serious opioid use disorder.  I discovered 
he would fill the monthly prescription, save one patch for the day before his next appointment, and 
then orally consume the rest over a few days.  There was simply no reasonably or careful way we 
could have detected what was really going on.   
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C. Qualitative Overprescribing 
The category of misprescribing that has occupied the lion’s share of 
attention is qualitative overprescribing.  Qualitative overprescribing 
occurs when providers prescribe or continue to prescribe opioids when 
risks to the patient outweigh the benefits.  This tends to happen in the 
context of chronic pain and with ongoing prescribing.  It occurs when 
prescribers are not carefully assessing risks and benefits of the drug or 
dose to the patient.208  This can also happen when the provider is not 
vigilant in tracking prescription dates and amounts. 209 
Qualitative overprescribing has been the implicit focus of the majority 
of practice and policy efforts.  Most clinical practice guidelines focus on 
qualitative overprescribing.210  A long list of so called risk mitigation 
strategies also fall in this category, primarily in terms of detecting 
underlying SUDs or diversion.211  If actually used as a clinical tool to 
identify new risks to patients from SUD, they are appropriate.  Instead, if 
they are used as a pseudo law enforcement mechanism, they will fail to 
reduce overall opioid related harms. 
Until very recently, legal enactments focused almost solely on this 
category.  “Pill mill” or pain clinic legislation was focused on both corrupt 
prescribing and on qualitative overprescribing, while ignoring significant 
harms associated with other classes of misprescribing.  State prescribing 
laws and regulations singled out opioid prescribing for chronic pain, while 
ignoring completely the palpable harms of other drug classes and practices 
that left significant numbers of pills available for diversion.212  In fact, this 
area is likely over-regulated.  The focus on this area may be contributing 
to the neglect of other important sources of prescription opioid related 
harms.  It may also be creating additional provider avoidance of patients 
with chronic pain, as well as avoidance of appropriately addressing co-
morbid conditions such as SUD. 
                                                          
 208.   For a comprehensive overview of treating chronic pain, see Martin D. Cheatle, 
Biopsychosocial Approach to Assessing and Managing Patients with Chronic Pain, 100 MED. CLINICS 
N. AM. 43 (2016). 
 209.   Wright et al., supra note 30, at 7 (2016) (telling the story of an emergency department patient 
whose primary care doctor provided a 90-day supply of opioids approximately every month through 
carefully timed appointments and selective use of pharmacies).   
 210.   See, e.g., Dowell et al., supra note 4; FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., GUIDELINES FOR THE 
CHRONIC USE OF OPIOID ANALGESICS (2017) http://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/ 
policies/opioid_guidelines_as_adopted_april-2017_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HVN-2LL9]; Judith 
A. Paice et al., Management of Chronic Pain in Survivors of Adult Cancers: American Society of 
Clinical Oncology Clinical Practice Guideline, J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY (2016).  
 211.   See, e.g., Dineen supra note 277, at 8–13; 47–73. 
 212.   See, e.g., id. 
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D. Quantitative Overprescribing 
Quantitative overprescribing occurs when providers prescribe more 
opioids than a patient is likely to need, leading to large quantities of 
leftover pills.  This most commonly happens after hospitalization, 
surgeries,213 or dental procedures.214  Despite long standing evidence of 
the contribution of leftover pills to the opioid crisis,215 relatively little 
effort has been directed at this problem.  There remain wide variations in 
prescribing practices and paucity of clinical guidelines.216  Only very 
recently have states started passing laws and promulgating regulations 
aimed at this issue. 
Quantitative overprescribing is primarily a problem of reflexive 
prescribing coupled with the general misprescribing heuristic, which 
overemphasizes prescribing for chronic pain.  Research indicates it is 
difficult for providers to abandon established practices.217  There is 
interesting work in choice architecture to reduce prescribers’ tendencies to 
follow old patterns through electronic default rules.218  Some recent studies 
have found that state laws and institutional policies can reduce the number 
of post-procedure prescriptions.219  In a comprehensive study by Pitt and 
                                                          
 213.   See, e.g., Karsten Bartels et al., Opioid Use and Storage Patterns by Patients after Hospital 
Discharge Following Surgery, PLOS ONE, Jan. 29, 2016, at 1, 1, https://doi.org/ 
10.1371/journal.pone.0147972 [https://perma.cc/SKA4-KLVX]; Maureen V. Hill et al., Guideline for 
Discharge Opioid Prescriptions After Inpatient General Surgical Procedures, 226 J. AM. C. 
SURGEONS 996, 996 (2018); Heidi N. Overton et al., Opioid-Prescribing Guidelines for Common 
Surgical Procedures: An Expert Panel Consensus, 227 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 411, 411 (2018).  
 214.   See, e.g., Niodita Gupta et al., Opioid Prescribing Practices from 2010 Through 2015 
Among Dentists in the United States: What Do Claims Data Tell Us? 149 J. AM. DENTAL ASS’N 237, 
237 (2018).  
 215.   See, e.g., Dineen supra note 277, at 8–13.  
 216.   See, e.g., Ahmed I. Eid et al., Variation of Opioid Prescribing Patterns Among Patients 
Undergoing Similar Surgery on the Same Acute Care Surgery Service of the Same Institution: Time 
for Standardization? 164 SURGERY 926 (2018).  
 217.   See, e.g., Daniel J. Niven et al., Effect of Published Scientific Evidence on Glycemic Control 
in Adult Intensive Care Units, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 801, 801 (2015) (“Among patients admitted 
to adult ICUs in the United States, there was a slow steady adoption of tight glycemic control following 
publication of a clinical trial that suggested benefit, with little to no deadoption following a subsequent 
trial that demonstrated harm. There is an urgent need to understand and promote the deadoption of 
ineffective clinical practices.”).  
 218.   See, e.g., Kara Zivin et al., Implementing Electronic Health Record Default Settings to 
Reduce Opioid Overprescribing: A Pilot Study, 20 PAIN MED. 103, 103 (2019) (finding setting default 
number of opioid pills to 15 in the electronic prescribing system in two health systems led to changes 
in prescribing patterns, although most interviewed prescribers believed the change had no impact on 
their practices). 
 219.   See, e.g., Charles D. MacLean et al., Impact of Policy Interventions on Postoperative Opioid 
Prescribing, PAIN MED., Nov. 8, 2018, at 1, 1, https://doi.org/10.1093/pm/pny215 [https://perma.cc/ 
T2XG-XX6Y].  
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colleagues, interventions aimed at acute pain prescribing were one of the 
few interventions predicted to reduce overall death rates at both five and 
ten years.220  Enhanced policy efforts directed at reducing quantitative 
overprescribing are warranted. 
E. Multiclass Misprescribing 
Multiclass misprescribing is dangerous and sometimes deadly.221  For 
far too long, the dangers have been ignored, overshadowed, and 
downplayed because of the misprescribing heuristic.222  Multiclass 
misprescribing occurs when opioids are prescribed carelessly along with 
other drugs known to increase the risk of harm, including the risk of opioid 
poisonings, without significant clinical justification.  It may also occur 
when opioids are prescribed carelessly to patients who may have alcohol 
or other substance use disorders or without warning patients of the dangers 
of taking opioids along with alcohol and illicit substances.223 
Benzodiazepines are among the most dangerous co-prescribed 
drugs;224 however, concerns are emerging about other drugs frequently 
used to treat pain but that also potentiate the effects of opioids, such as 
gabapentin and pregabalin.225  One recent study found 26% of opioid 
related poisoning decedents also had gabapentin in their system.226 
                                                          
 220.   Pitt et al., supra note 93, at 1396–97.  
 221.   In one study, co-prescription of benzodiazepines was associated with a ten-fold increase in 
mortality. Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Cohort Study of the Impact of High-Dose Opioid Analgesics on 
Overdose Mortality, 17 PAIN MED. 85, 85–98 (2016). It is also associated with a higher risk of eventual 
fatal poisoning. See Mark Olfson et al., Risks of Fatal Opioid Overdose During the First Year 
Following Nonfatal Overdose, 190 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 112, 112–19 (2018).  
 222.   See, e.g., Dineen, supra note 27, at 19–20.  
 223.   See, e.g., Karlyn A. Edwards et al., Co-use of Alcohol and Opioids, 4 CURRENT ADDICTION 
REP. 194, 194–99 (2017).  
 224.   The chemical mechanisms that enhance morbidity and mortality of combined 
benzodiazepines and opioids is still not fully understood but the combination is far more dangerous 
than opioids alone. See, e.g., Neville F. Ford, An Opioid-Benzodiazepine Interaction: Benzodiazepines 
as Opioids?, 9 J. PHARMACOLOGY & PHARMACOTHERAPEUTICS 165, 165–66 (2018).  
 225.   Gabapentin (brand name Neurontin) is FDA approved to treat epilepsy and post-herpetic 
neuralgia and off label for neuropathic pain and other painful conditions.  Pregabelin (brand name 
Lyrica) is approved for multiple uses, including seizures, neuropathic pain, and fibromyalgia.  They 
are not controlled substances but may be substances of misuse nonetheless. See generally Alyssa M. 
Peckham et al., All-Cause and Drug-Related Medical Events Associated with Overuse of Gabapentin 
and/or Opioid Medications: A Retrospective Cohort Analysis of a Commercially Insured US 
Population, 41 DRUG SAFETY 213 (2018); Kirk E. Evoy et al., Reports of Gabapentin and Pregabalin 
Abuse, Misuse, Dependence, or Overdose: An Analysis of the Food and Drug Administration Adverse 
Events Reporting System (FAERS), RES. SOC. & ADMIN. PHARMACY, June 28, 2018, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sapharm.2018.06.018 [https://perma.cc/92PK-GZ85].   
 226.   Svetla Slavova et al., Prevalence of Gabapentin in Drug Overdose Postmortem Toxicology 
Testing Results, 186 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 80, 80 (2018). 
2019 DEFINITIONS MATTER 999 
Gabapentin and pregabalin are implicated in many intentional and 
unintentional poisoning deaths, with or without opioids.227  This is the 
likely related to both their chemical action and the overlap between the 
rate of suicides and use of these drugs in patients with chronic pain. 
Prescribers may ignore these dangers because of the focus on opioid 
dosage alone. 
Significant co-prescribing of opioids and benzodiazepines continues 
to occur.228  Co-prescribing of benzodiazepines and opioids is more 
dangerous than prescribing either opioids or benzodiazepines alone;229 and 
risks are particularly acute in the first 90 days of concurrent prescription.230  
The rate of combined benzodiazepine and opioid deaths continues to rise, 
even as prescription opioid mortality stabilizes.231  There are, of course, 
some clinical contexts in which co-prescribing is still appropriate, 
primarily in patients with complicated co-morbid psychiatric conditions.  
Any changes or tapering must be handled with extreme care;232 however, 
“long term use for chronic pain has poor scientific support and should be 
discouraged and avoided.”233 
The disproportionate focus on opioids may lead prescribers to 
underappreciate the risks of benzodiazepines.  Benzodiazepine prescribing 
                                                          
 227.   See Evoy et al., supra note 225. 
 228.   See, e.g., Joseph A. Ladapo et al., Physician Prescribing of Opioids to Patients at Increased 
Risk of Overdose from Benzodiazepine Use in the United States, 75 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 623, 623 
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2018.0544 [https://perma.cc/QKP7-YC6E]. 
 229.   See, e.g., Eric J. Hawkins et al., New Opioid and Benzodiazepine Co-Prescribing and 
Mortality Among Veteran Affairs Patients with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Retrospective Cohort 
Study (Preprints with The Lancet, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3235664 [https://perma.cc/B53U-
739C].  Co-prescribing is also associated with non-poisoning morbidity, such as fall and emergency 
department visits.  See Bobbi Jo H. Yarborough et al., Correlates of Benzodiazepine Use and Adverse 
Outcomes Among Patients with Chronic Pain Prescribed Long-term Opioid Therapy, PAIN MED. 
(Sept. 10, 2018), at 1, 1–8, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30204893 [https://perma.cc/SST9-
NGY6] (finding 25% of a veteran population on chronic opioid therapy were co-prescribed 
benzodiazepines and that factor alone contributed to increased falls and emergency department visits). 
 230.   Inmaculada Hernandez et al., Exposure-Response Association Between Concurrent Opioid 
and Benzodiazepine Use and Risk of Opioid-Related Overdose in Medicare Part D 
Beneficiaries, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (June 2018), at 1, 1, https://jamanetwork.com/ 
journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2685628 [https://perma.cc/M9VZ-R674] (finding a five-fold 
risk of overdose in the first 90 days of treatment which dropped to a 1.87 increased risk thereafter).  
 231.   See Overdose Death Rates, supra note 76.  
 232.   Co-prescribing may be appropriate for patients with anxiety disorders, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, or other psychiatric co-morbidities. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Oldfield et al., Multimodal 
Treatment Options, Including Rotating to Buprenorphine, Within a Multidisciplinary Pain Clinic for 
Patients on Risky Opioid Regimens: A Quality Improvement Study, 19 PAIN MED. S38, S43 (2018) 
(“While. . . guidelines suggest tapering benzodiazepines in patients prescribed [opioids], tapering 
requires caution and can be particularly difficult among veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), for whom tapering can be compounded by PTSD exacerbations.”). 
 233.   Peppin et al., supra note 55, at 126. 
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has increased over the last decade, even as rates of opioid prescribing 
decline.234  According to Argawal and Langdon: 
[A]s opioids lose favor among prescribers, we must remain cognizant 
that this might lead to increased use of other potentially dangerous drugs 
such as benzodiazepines, especially because evidence for their use in 
conditions such as back pain is limited.235 
Recent research on the impact of the CDC Guideline on prescribing 
indicates that, while opioid prescribing reductions are significant, 
benzodiazepine prescribing changes are minute.236  This remains true 
despite the CDC Guideline specifically recommending avoidance of co-
prescribing;237 of course the subject of the CDC Guideline is opioids, 
which may cause neglect of the benzodiazepine information. 
At least one group of physician researchers have recommended 
guidelines aimed directly at reducing benzodiazepine prescribing.238  A 
few cities have published benzodiazepine specific prescribing 
guidelines,239 rather than simply including the risk in opioid focused 
guidance.240  Separate guidance for benzodiazepine prescribing is 
increasingly needed as individuals with OUDs shift to illicit opioids and 
as the dangers of co-use of alcohol become more clear.  At a minimum, 
separate guidance for benzodiazepine prescribing may prompt providers 
to warn patients of the risk of concurrent use of opioids that they do not 
prescribe, as well as initiate communication about substance use and 
                                                          
 234.   Sumit D. Agarwal & Bruce E. Landon, Patterns of Outpatient Benzodiazepine Prescribing 
in the United States, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (Jan. 2019), at 1, 1, https://jamanetwork.com/ 
journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2722576 [https://perma.cc/4JE6-P95G].  
 235.   Id. at 8 (emphasis added).  See also Scott M. Fishman, Risk of the View Through the Keyhole: 
There Is Much More to Physician Reactions to the DEA Than the Number of Formal Actions, 7 PAIN 
MED. 360, 361 (2006), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1526-4637.2006.00194.x [https://perma.cc/8PAM-
Q247] (“[I]t is well established that when physicians are faced with barriers to prescribing a certain 
type of medication they will often prescribe around that barrier, turning to drugs that are perceived to 
be less scrutinized, even if they are less efficacious and/or potentially harmful. This pattern is known 
as the substitution effect.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 236.   Bohnert et al., supra note 61, at 371. 
 237.   Dowell et al., supra note 4, at 31–32 (Recommendation 11).  
 238.   Matthew E. Hirschtritt et al., Outpatient, Combined Use of Opioid and Benzodiazepine 
Medications in the United States, 1993–2014, 9 PREVENTATIVE MED. REP., 49, 51–53 (2018).  
 239.   See, e.g., The N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Judicious Prescribing of 
Benzodiazepines, 35 CITY HEALTH INFORMATION 13 (2016), https://ndews.umd.edu/sites/ndews. 
umd.edu/files/Benzodiazepines%20CHI.pdf [https://perma.cc/V526-42UU]; COMMUNITY 
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE PRESCRIBING AND MONITORING OF 
BENZODIAZEPINES AND RELATED MEDICATIONS (2018), https://dbhids.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/07/Clinical-Guidelines-for-Prescribing-and-Monitoring-Benzodiazepines.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
L7XS-ZFTK] (Community Behavioral Health contracts with the city of Philadelphia).  
 240.   See, e.g., Dowell et al., supra note 4. 
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SUDs.  This approach may help correct for the availability bias induced 
by the narrow focus on opioids alone. 
F. Underprescribing & Opioid Related Abandonment 
So, what amount of prescribing is appropriate?  This represents a 
difficult question since one size does not fit all.  A particular type or dose 
of one medication may be appropriate for one patient and condition and 
wholly inappropriate for someone else.  Yet despite the medical necessity 
of tailoring treatments to the individual, the tendency today is for an 
across-the-board reduction in prescription opioid availability.241  
The most universally ignored category of misprescribing is 
underprescribing.  It may be a serious contributor to overall morbidity and 
mortality, for example by contributing to suicides or unintentional 
poisonings.242  Underprescribing means withholding appropriate opioids 
(including too rapidly or arbitrarily tapering or discontinuing opioids), 
refusing to consider opioids at all (blanket exclusions) and failing to 
provide or refer patients to treatment for opioid use or other substance use 
disorders.243  This is particularly problematic for legacy patients, who are 
among the most neglected and vilified in the current climate around 
opioids.244 
It is almost inconceivable that after more than a decade of public 
concern about long-term opioids use, and after several decades of 
inappropriately liberal prescribing practices, there remains almost no 
guidance to prescribers as to how, when, and if to taper patients off of 
opioids.  Patients with chronic pain and related conditions are already 
highly stigmatized and report feeling dismissed, discounted, and ignored 
by clinicians, family, friends, and in public policy.  Existing law, policy, 
and guidance on opioids has rendered these patients essentially invisible 
                                                          
 241.   Michael E. Schatman & Stephen J. Ziegler, Pain Management, Prescription Opioid 
Mortality, and the CDC: Is The Devil in the Data?, 10 J. PAIN RES. 2489, 2491 (2017).  
 242.   Dr. Thomas Kline has assembled an informal list of patients with chronic pain that died by 
suicide after abrupt or too rapid tapering.  Thomas Kline, #OpioidCrisis Pain Related SUICIDES 
Associated with Forced Taper, MEDIUM (Jan. 23, 2019), https://medium.com/@ThomasKlineMD/ 
opioidcrisis-pain-related-suicides-associated-with-forced-tapers-c68c79ecf84d 
[https://perma.cc/ZU7T-7FLB].  
 243.   Ironically, while the evidence is strong that appropriate pharmacotherapy for addiction, such 
as with buprenorphine, is effective and lifesaving, law enforcement may further discourage its use by 
providers. See, e.g., Maia Szalavitz, The Feds Are Raiding the Offices of Doctors Who Prescribe 
Addiction Medication, TONIC (June 26, 2018, 2:44 PM), https://tonic.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
8xevwb/dea-raids-addiction-doctors [https://perma.cc/B894-7WPX].  
 244.   For a range of first-person experiences of legacy patients and those with both pain and opioid 
use disorders, see Kelly K. Dineen & Daniel S. Goldberg, Living in Pain in the Midst of the Opioid 
Crisis, 8 NARRATIVE INQUIRY BIOETHICS 189 (2018), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/712000/pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XG3L-EHG7]. 
1002 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
except as an object of blame and suspicion; guidance focuses instead on 
when starting opioids may be appropriate, maximum doses, and risk 
mitigation techniques to prevent opioid diversion from the particular 
prescriber. 
If anything, the obligations to legacy patients are heightened—more 
than anyone, prescribers (usually in good faith and under mistaken beliefs 
about the relative benefits and risks of opioids) put them in the position 
they are in now.  At a minimum, providers are morally obligated to 
compassionately help patients reduce or discontinue opioids when 
appropriate.  And providers need the space from policymakers and 
enforcement officials to do so.  By ignoring the compassionate and 
appropriate treatment of legacy patients, policymakers implicitly 
communicate that those patients are less deserving than others who might 
today be spared opioids in the first place. 
When discontinuation is directed by policy, it is usually done without 
any information on how to do so carefully and appropriately.245  According 
to Frank and colleagues, a 2017 systemic review of opioid tapering 
explained: 
There is little evidence to guide clinicians in the process of opioid 
tapering, especially in primary care settings, where most opioid therapy 
is prescribed. In addition, little is known about the risks and benefits of 
opioid tapering. . . . The effects of opioid tapering on patient outcomes 
have not been systematically reviewed.246 
The absence of evidence has not stopped some policymakers.  In 2018, 
Oregon proposed a mandatory reduction to zero opioids for all Medicaid 
beneficiaries over twelve months.247  This blunt approach is an affront to 
patient centered medical care and based on little more than deeply held 
bias or an inability to understand the public health and medical evidence. 
Little has changed as of 2019, as the option to reduce or discontinue 
opioids pervades opioid prescribing guidelines, law, and policy with 
                                                          
 245.   The Veterans Administration is the only group to take these risks seriously and to have 
implemented a national program.  See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Oliva et al., Development and Applications 
of the Veterans Health Administration’s Stratification Tool for Opioid Risk Mitigation (STORM) to 
Improve Opioid Safety And Prevent Overdose and Suicide, 14 PSYCHOL. SERV. 34 (2017).   
 246.   Joseph W. Frank et al., Patient Outcomes in Dose Reduction or Discontinuation of Long-
Term Opioid Therapy, 167 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 181, 181 (2017).  
 247.   See, e.g., Oregon’s Medicaid Program Weighs Cutting Off Chronic Pain Patients from 
Opioids, APHA (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.pharmacist.com/article/oregons-medicaid-program-
weighs-cutting-chronic-pain-patients-opioids [https://perma.cc/N8FY-67VH]; see also Maia 
Szalavitz, Forcing Pain Patients Off Their Meds Won’t End the Opioid Crisis, TONIC (Aug. 21, 2018, 
5:42 PM), https://tonic.vice.com/en_us/article/7xqa44/forcing-pain-patients-off-their-meds-will-not-
end-the-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/SZ7D-8PFS].  
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virtually no information on how to do so carefully.  This representation of 
the misprescribing heuristic totally ignores the sometimes-deadly harms 
of doing so inappropriately.  According to Darnell and colleagues, 
[C]ountless “legacy patients” with chronic pain who were progressively 
escalated to high opioid doses, often over many years, now face 
additional and very serious risks resulting from rapid tapering or related 
policies that mandate extreme dose reductions that are aggressive and 
unrealistic.248 
There is certainly no appetite by regulators to sanction prescribers for 
the equally harmful practice of too rapid or involuntary tapering.  In fact, 
significant potential harms—from increasing suffering to death by 
suicide—have been ignored by every major policy document and 
prescribing law.  An international group of stakeholders has called for 
urgent attention to this issue saying, 
New and grave risks now exist because of forced opioid tapering: an 
alarming increase in reports of patient suffering and suicides within and 
outside of the Veterans Affairs Healthcare System in the United States. 
Reports suggest that forced tapering is also occurring in patients on 
opioid doses below the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Opioid Guideline threshold of 90 morphine equivalent daily dose.  These 
patients too are at risk of harm from overly aggressive tapering.249 
The considerations for legacy patients are different than for deciding 
about beginning opioids in the first place.  Opioid tapers must be patient 
centered and supportive, without threats of abandonment.  Simply, no data 
exists to support involuntary tapering or “to drastically low levels without 
exposing patients to potentially life-threatening harms.”250  What 
information does exist reveals that 1) most patients are tapered for 
behaviors seen as indicative of misuse, 2) few are referred for substance 
use disorder evaluation and treatment, and 3) perceptions of heightened 
monitoring are associated with non-follow-up by the patient.251  “Once the 
                                                          
 248.   Beth D. Darnell et al., International Stakeholder Community of Pain Experts and Leaders 
Call for an Urgent Action on Forced Opioid Tapering, 20 PAIN MED. 429, 430 (2019). 
 249.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 250.   Id. 
 251.   See, e.g., Jawad M. Husain et al., Reasons for Opioid Discontinuation and Unintended 
Consequences Following Opioid Discontinuation Within the TOPCARE Trial, PAIN MED., Jun. 27, 
2018, at 1, 4–7.  Concerns are not limited to the United States.  Canadian physicians reported similar 
concerns after guidance was published on safely prescribing opioids but neglected any mention on 
safe opioid tapering.  See Ruth Dubin et al., The Risks of Opioid Tapering or Rapid Discontinuation, 
CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN (Dec. 5, 2017), http://www.cfp.ca/news/2017/12/05/12-05 
[https://perma.cc/F8YM-S4QQ] (“The 2017 guideline focuses entirely on reducing opioid doses, yet 
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decision is made to stop the chronic opioid use, the patient must be 
counseled and educated on the reasons behind the decision.  It must be 
made clear to the patient that the therapy is being abandoned, not the 
patient.”252 
A promising option for assisting legacy patients exists at some VA 
facilities, where patients receive multidisciplinary care, tapering, or 
tapering off and onto buprenorphine.253  Failure to consider something like 
buprenorphine is classic underprescribing—buprenorphine is broadly 
effective for both pain and opioid use disorder while being less harmful 
than other opioids, and it may be more effective than other opioids in 
certain patients.254  Oldfield and colleagues describe their approach to 
tapering this way: 
We strive to express empathy and a reassurance to the patient about non-
abandonment.  Patient preference is the main driver determining next 
steps; however, patients with very high opioid doses . . . , those who are 
co- prescribed benzodiazepines or other sedatives, and those who are 
already experiencing opioid-related harms . . .are counseled that changes 
to their regimen need to start immediately.255 
Yet, practices are trending more toward aggressive tapering, with 
multitudes of anecdotal reports that legacy patients are either abandoned 
outright or less than gently coerced into aggressive tapers by providers, 
who are shouldering the burden of the blunt instrument of law 
enforcement.256  Providers understand that scrutiny is not created equally.  
                                                          
makes no mention of the risks of opiate withdrawal. By adopting the guideline as a standard of 
practice, prescribers might taper people too rapidly or cut them off entirely. Many family MD’s have 
refused to prescribe opiates or even take chronic pain patients into their practices. Nor do they have 
training in how to recognize withdrawal symptoms or manage the risks associated with the adrenergic 
and autonomic overdrive of opiate withdrawal.”).  
 252.   Mark S. Wallace & Alexander Papp, Opioid Withdrawal, in CHALLENGING CASES AND 
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A death that might involve a prescription opioid raises far more alarm than 
a suicide death by another means, such as Jay’s in this article’s 
introduction.  For example, state law enforcement agents are rapidly 
adopting a practice of notifying prescribers of patient deaths, but in narrow 
and incoherent circumstances.  Massachusetts is one example, where the 
Attorney General is sending letters to prescribers if they prescribed opioids 
within 60 days of a patient’s death.257  The focus is only on opioids. A 
provider who abruptly discontinues opioids would receive no such letter.  
Nor would providers who prescribed, for example, high doses of 
benzodiazepines, a drug also associated with suicide risk.258  This is 
illustrative of the misprescribing heuristic.  Dr. Lynn Webster has written 
about the harms that can result from the push to reduce even therapeutic 
opioid doses out of regulatory concerns, telling the story of his patient 
Jack.  Jack’s suicide note said he “couldn’t live with the pain anymore.”259  
Dr. Webster said, 
I had to ask myself if my concern for my freedom and licensure had led 
to this tragedy.  This was a moral dilemma for me.  I could have 
continued to prescribe a high dose of opioid, but if he had died, even 
from a natural cause, the medical examiner might have said the death 
was an unintentional overdose from opioids.  Jack might have even 
intentionally overdosed and no one would know.  Deaths from opioids 
have become red flags for investigations.  By contrast, Jack’s death by 
suicide was not widely recognized by anyone beyond his family and me.  
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[https://perma.cc/47DU-DBF7] (profiling a man who died by suicide via a gunshot wound after losing 
access to prescription opioids abruptly); blairhm, Comment to Are CDC Opioid Guidelines Causing 
More Suicides?, PAIN NEWS NETWORK (May 27, 2016), http://accurateclinic.com/wp-
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News-Network.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ6G-WCFT] (“I am 39 and have chronic pain . . . . I have 
almost constant deep bone and joint pain . . . . I suffer with this pain every day. I get migraines 
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I was tormented by the thought that he might have died because I was 
unable to help him escape extreme pain.260 
Prescribing policy must begin addressing the ultimate goal of reducing 
overall morbidity and mortality.  “Every dollar spent on enforcement is a 
dollar not spent on treatment, harm reduction, or prevention.  As we failed 
to invest in what works, the crisis has mutated into something far more 
deadly.”261  The misprescribing heuristic is likely to continue shifting the 
sources of harm and driving more providers to act against their patients’ 
interests.  In particular, the focus on a few kinds of prescribing behaviors 
is causing increased suffering and may contribute to the shift to illicit 
opioids and suicidality. 
Suicidal ideation is particularly acute when someone is experiencing 
withdrawal, which occurs with abandonment and too rapid tapering.  
Sometimes this can happen simply from a lack of expertise.  Travis Rieder 
told his story about withdrawal after spending months on opioids 
following a serious, crushing trauma, which required five major surgeries.  
He experienced suicidality for the first time in his life.  Some the best 
doctors in the world (at John Hopkins) had no idea how to properly taper 
him off of opioids.  He wrote: 
No one will be surprised to hear that I was angry.  Angry at myself, angry 
at my doctors, angry at the medical community.  Just- angry.  I had been 
hit by a van and undergone five surgeries, yet the worst part of the 
experience was my month in withdrawal hell.  How could it be that my 
doctor’s best tapering advice led to that experience?  And how could it 
be that not one of my more than ten doctors could help?262 
Serious concerns about suicide in patients with pain is poorly 
addressed in larger policy discussions, despite the extremely high risk it 
presents.263  Pain is an independent risk factor for suicide—a connection 
noted for centuries.264  Plato counted painful illness as one of three 
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exceptions to his general moral prohibition of suicide.265  While suicide 
was historically condemned and even punished as a crime,266 the chronic 
pain of the deceased was often a mitigating circumstance.267  Under old 
English law, when chronic pain was an underlying condition in death by 
suicide, surviving family members faced lesser property losses than in 
cases without this mitigating condition.268  The same was true for 18th 
Century France, where chronic pain was a documented underlying reason 
for many suicides.269  Chronic pain was often seen as an exculpatory factor 
for the crime of suicide, and juries often declared the cause of death was 
not suicide but actually the underlying illness.270 
Today, the association remains between pain and suicide by any 
means and may be growing stronger.271  The rate of suicide in patients with 
chronic pain is also increasing.272  This is also true for adolescents with 
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chronic pain, in whom duration rather than severity of pain presents the 
greatest risk.273  There may be a further association between chronic pain, 
suicidality, and opioid use (either current or previous).  One study suggests 
that opioid dose is associated with suicide by any means in patients with 
chronic pain.274  In 2017, more than 40% of suicide and poisoning deaths 
involved opioids.275  Between 2003 and 2014, of those with chronic pain 
that died by suicide, nearly 54% used a firearm while nearly 30% died 
from poisoning (just over half of those attributed to opioids).276  Of all of 
the decedents with chronic pain who were tested, 51.9% had opioids in 
their system and 47.2% had benzodiazepines.277  In general, the rates of 
intentional (suicidal) poisoning deaths are drastically undercounted, with 
some researchers estimating the rate is closer to 20-30%, or even higher, 
of all poisonings.278  According to Rockett and colleagues, “suicide is 
plausibly the most underestimated manner of death in both clinical 
medicine and public health.”279 
Yet, assessing the risk of suicidality is a mere afterthought in most 
guidelines and laws, if it appears at all.280  “Considering that approximately 
1 patient out of 4 reports at least some form of suicidal thoughts, the 
development of a suicide prevention intervention to be included in chronic 
pain management programs is clearly justified.”281  This is especially 
important around times of change in opioid doses or duration.  Only a few 
have explicitly called for attention to suicide in patients with chronic 
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pain.282  One section of the SUPPORT Act does draw attention to this 
problem but outside the context of tapering or involuntary 
discontinuation.283 
There is a disproportionate focus in policy and guidance on screening 
to prevent diversion (which may or may not be directly harmful) at the 
expense of the serious suffering and life-threatening nature of suicidality.  
To the extent policy documents mention suicide, they frame the problem 
as one of serious mental illness; of course, co-morbid mental illness 
compounds the risks, but pain is an independent risk factor for suicidality.  
The American Society of Interventional Pain Physicians guidelines only 
mention suicide in the context of serious psychiatric comorbidities and 
without specific guidance to assess for suicide risk.284  The FSMB’s 2017 
Model Guidelines for the Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics mention the 
word suicide only once and makes no recommendations about assessing 
patients for suicidality.285  The CDC Guideline mentions the word 
“suicide” three times, always in the context of co-morbid mental illness or 
previous suicide attempts;286 there are no recommendations regarding 
suicide screening.  In contrast, the word “abuse” appears ninety-two times, 
“urine drug testing” appears thirty-eight times, “overdose” appears 181 
times, “substance use disorder” appears thirty-two times, and “risk 
mitigation” appears fourteen times.287  Simply put, policy is more focused 
on ameliorating the indignation of providers who may feel fooled—or the 
indignation of regulators—than addressing palpable harms to individual 
patients. 
Much more work is needed to provide guidance to providers about 
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safe tapering and discontinuation plans, increase comfort levels with 
buprenorphine prescribing, and assessing patients for suicidality.  
Regulators must provide the space providers need to do this 
compassionately and effectively.  Dr. Weeks published the story of his 
sister, a legacy patient who died from acute withdrawal after she was 
abruptly discontinued from opioids when her long-term prescriber 
retired.288  She was unable to find another prescriber to continue or 
carefully taper her opioids or transition her to buprenorphine.  He wrote, 
“I worry that recent efforts to address the opioid crisis by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, state boards of medicine and the 
administration may have the unintended consequence of producing more 
heroin use, or outcomes like the one my sister had.”289  He has since 
become a buprenophrine prescriber and tries to help legacy patients like 
his sister.290  According to Dr. Weeks, 
The profession needs not only to reduce initial and profligate use of 
opioids, but also needs to recognize and approach opioid addiction as an 
iatrogenic illness for patients who have already been prescribed 
substantial quantities of opioids.  Professionals need to stop labeling 
[and] provide compassionate care . . . .291 
There are some bright spots for legacy patients.  Tapering patients off 
of opioids requires significant support, and some promising research has 
shown that interventions such as weekly supports and multidisciplinary 
care are promising.292  For patients in chronic pain there may be particular 
opportunities to reduce harm.  For example, Petrosky and colleagues found 
“a history of suicidal thoughts, plans, and attempts and disclosure of 
suicidal intent were more common among decedents with chronic pain 
than those without it, indicating that opportunities for intervention may 
have been available.”293  In other words, patients with chronic pain may 
talk about their intentions more often than others, providing a space for 
prevention and intervention. 
In the end, policy makers must understand that underprescribing poses 
distinct harms.  Currently no law or regulation addresses these harms. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
[I]t is still important both to recognize how regulation of the use of 
opioids in medical practice is exceptional, and to try to understand 
whether the public health and public policy rationales offered for this 
regulation are persuasive reasons to depart from the norm.  It may be, 
for example, that the regulations as enacted are not as narrowly or 
wisely tailored as they might be to fulfill the articulated policy and public 
health goals.294 
To date, no policy, law, or guidance defines inappropriate prescribing.  
This leads to policy development and evaluation not guided by evidence 
but by bias and oversimplification.  The SUPPORT Act is the first major 
law to seek such a definition.  This article advances an initial framework 
for such a definition, one that may provide a behavioral public choice 
architecture to address the biases of regulators.  Through such a device, 
policy development may progress in ways more likely to align regulation 
and enforcement to prescribing related harms. 
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